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ABSTRACT
Finance startups are offering automated advice, touchless payments, and other products that could
bring great societal benefits, including lower prices and expanded access to credit. Yet unlike in
other digital arenas in which American companies are global leaders, such as search engines and ride
hailing, the United States lags in consumer financial technology. This Article posits that the current
competition policy framework is holding back consumer financial innovation. It then identifies a
contributor missing from the literature: the institutional design of federal regulators. Competition
authority—including antitrust and the extension of business licenses—is spread across at least five
agencies. Each is focused on other missions or industries. The Department of Justice (DOJ), hindered by
statutes and knowledge gaps, devotes significantly fewer resources to banking than to other industries
in merger review because it leans heavily on prudential regulators. The Federal Reserve and other
prudential regulators prioritize financial stability, which conflicts with their competition mandate. No
agency has the right authority, motivation, and expertise to promote consumer financial competition.
Innovation has raised the stakes for fixing this structural flaw in finance, and potentially
in other heavily regulated industries. If allowed to compete fully, financial technology
challengers (“fintechs”) could bring large consumer welfare advances and reduce the size of
“Too Big to Fail” banks, thereby lessening the chances of a financial crisis. If allowed to grow
unchecked, fintechs or the big banks acquiring them may reach the kind of digital market
dominance seen in Google, Facebook, and Amazon, thereby increasing systemic risk. Whether
the goal is to benefit consumers, strengthen markets, or prevent crises, a reallocation of
competition authority would better position regulators to navigate the future of innovation.
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INTRODUCTION
Technology challengers are providing digital alternatives to traditional
financial institutions. PayPal and related startups transfer funds with the press
of a button. Automated assistants can, with access to consumers’ personal data,
recommend a tailored credit card, bank account, or loan with lower rates.1
Other consumer industries, such as electronics, music, and books, have seen
Fortune 500 companies dissolve and profits fall in the face of innovation.2 In
contrast, the largest banks have steadily gained market share.3 One explanation
for this outcome is that banks are publicly subsidized and insulated from
competition. Although legal scholars have recognized banking competition
shortcomings,4 they have yet to pay sustained attention to the intersection
between competition policy and the recent wave of digital innovation, often
known as “fintech.” Nor have they, to my knowledge, analyzed how regulators’
organizational design and mission conflict undermine financial competition.
This Article outlines how fintech alters the competition policy analysis and
argues that existing agencies are inadequate to respond. The advent of fintech
changes the analysis and raises the stakes for getting competition right in three
main ways. First, digital innovation faces additional entry barriers. Unlike
European authorities, U.S. regulators have declined to offer banking licenses to
fintechs.5 Additionally, big banks have blocked fintechs from accessing
customers’ account information even when customers approve—a potentially
debilitating setback for a new service predicated on tailored advice.6 These
barriers extend recent scholarly calls for greater attention to exclusion in
antitrust7 and help explain why fintech startups—despite reinventing the
customer interface—generally partner with rather than compete against banks.8

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See infra Part I.A.
See CHARLES A. O’REILLY III & MICHAEL L. TUSHMAN, LEAD AND DISRUPT: HOW TO SOLVE THE
INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA, at ix–x (2016).
See Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust
Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1391 (2011).
See, e.g., id. at 1391; cf. Lawrence G. Baxter, Betting Big: Value, Caution and Accountability in
an Era of Large Banks and Complex Finance, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 765, 827 (2012)
(“The public subsidies provided to big banks are substantial . . . .”).
See infra Part IV.A.1.
See infra Part II.A.
See C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182, 1182 (2013).
See, e.g., Philippe Gelis, Why Fintech Banks Will Rule the World, CHRIS SKINNER’S BLOG (Apr.
9, 2015), http://thefinanser.com/2015/04/why-fintech-banks-will-rule-the-world.html
[http:// perma.cc/PEK7-9X28].
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Second, fintech creates new connections between competition policy and
systemic risk, defined as the chance that one financial institution’s failure could
cause a chain reaction of institutional failures and spark a financial crisis.9
Scholars have argued that fintech increases systemic risk in securities trading, by
creating new mechanisms for sudden and coordinated mass market
movements.10 Those inquiries have not focused on consumer products, but if
advisory fintechs gave similar advice to large numbers of consumers, they could
produce their own kind of unpredictable mass market movements.11 More
concentrated advisory fintech markets make coordinated conduct more likely,
which implicates antitrust policy.12
Additionally, banks’ size and interconnectedness can contribute to
systemic risk. Yet the largest banks have been purchasing fintechs uninhibited
by merger reviews.13 Whereas even the biggest banks today have around 10
percent of the share of deposits, a single technology firm has captured 60
percent or more of the market in social networking (Facebook), searches
(Google), and music downloads (Apple).14 If banks’ share in various markets
were to approach those of leading technology companies, the confluence of
finance and technology could create new systemic risks. In the alternative, if
fintechs were to offer cheaper online banking products, fintechs might shrink
the largest banks. Industry reports estimate that $4.7 trillion, or about onethird of bank revenues, are vulnerable to such fintech competition.15 The
downsizing of banks would reduce the chance that if one of them fails “the

9.
10.

11.
12.

13.
14.

15.

See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008).
See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, Infinite Financial Intermediation, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643, 661
(2015); William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018)
(discussing increased systemic risk due to fintech securities investments, virtual currencies,
and peer-to-peer lending).
See infra Part III.A.
Cf. Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, How Your Digital Helper May Undermine Your
Welfare, and Our Democracy, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (covering network
effects of virtual advisory assistants); Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence
& Collusion: When Computers Inhibit Competition (Univ. of Tenn. Knoxville Coll. of Law
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 267, 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2591874 (discussing algorithmically coordinated business conduct
and the relationship to antitrust law).
See infra Part III.A.
For the shares, see, for example, Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, Big Data and
Social Netbanks: Are You Ready to Replace Your Bank?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1211, 1233 (2016);
Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1781 (2012);
and Jamal Carnette, The Music Industry Should Thank Apple—Again, MOTLEY FOOL (Apr.
24, 2016, 2:44 PM), http://www.fool.com/investing/ general/2016/04/24/the-music-industryshould-thank-apple-again.aspx [http://perma.cc/CA9U-8J76].
See The Fintech Revolution, ECONOMIST, May 9, 2015, at 25.
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world’s financial system c[ould] collapse like a row of dominoes.”16 In sum, the
right competition policy could provide a partial market solution to the problem
of “Too Big To Fail” banks,17 while an inept competition policy could create
dangerous fintech-bank hybrids.
Finally, the U.S. economy may miss out on consumer welfare gains, and
cede market share to international firms, if its competition policy fails to pivot
for the fintech era. Fintech has the potential to lower prices, expand access
to finance, and improve efficiency.18 Yet U.S. consumer fintech products
have advanced at a slow pace compared to those in countries as diverse as China,
Kenya, Sweden, and the U.K.19 Slower innovation is potentially problematic in
its own right, and is additionally concerning given that blockchain and related
technologies are threatening to break down borders. Borderless finance could in
the future pit American financial firms made soft by years of protectionism
against foreign counterparts made leaner and more innovative by their home
markets.
Navigating this technological upheaval would be difficult for regulators
even with a strong institutional framework, but the current one has
considerable drawbacks. Competition authority for consumer financial
products is scattered across at least five agencies. Two antitrust divisions, at the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), share
general authority across diverse consumer financial and non-financial
industries. Statutory design and a lack of in-house financial expertise limit their
role.20
Three agencies, the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC),
lead competition regulation for banks.21 A tension arises because these
regulators must simultaneously pursue a more pressing mission: preserving the
stability of the financial system.22 Bank regulators’ main tool for stability is
preventing banks from failing, among other means by making sure banks have
adequate capital reserves and are not engaging in excessively risky behavior.23
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 193; see infra Part II.A.
The term “too big to fail” is connected to systemic risk. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, In Defense
of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 444 (2011).
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.D.
See infra Part IV.A.2.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.A.
See Rosa M. Lastra, The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision in
Europe, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 49, 56 (2003) (“Central bankers’ duties towards the
maintenance of ‘financial stability’ typically refer to maintenance of the safety and soundness
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Regulators are not supposed to insulate banks from more innovative
competitors. To the contrary, in analyzing new licenses, one of the OCC’s
official goals is to “foster healthy [market] competition.”24 But allowing new
fintech startups to compete fully could weaken big banks,25 and “politicians and
bank regulators could not survive if they were to permit those institutions to
fail.”26 As currently administered, banking regulators’ dual mission subsumes
competition under stability.
This Article proposes a regulatory reorganization analogous to what has
been done many times before to remove mission conflict.27 Most tellingly, prior
to the 2008 financial crisis, banking regulators carried a dual mission of protecting
consumers and ensuring financial stability. This pairing subordinated
consumer protection to stability.28 To solve this problem in the wake of the
subprime mortgage crisis,29 Congress launched a new agency, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).30 The CFPB took over
most of stability regulators’ consumer protection powers but has no
stability mission.31 Just as Congress revived consumer protection by
separating it from stability duties, Congress should do the same for
competition. Whether housed in a new or existing agency, an unconflicted
entity would improve the chances that consumer credit products rise and fall
based on market value rather than regulatory favoritism.
Part I of this Article gives an overview of fintech and explains why new
technology entrants might be expected to pose a challenge to traditional
financial institutions in open markets. Part II discusses the evidence that
competition is failing in consumer finance, paying particular attention to the

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

of the banking system.”); Levitin, supra note 17, at 444 (“The existing literature has generally
identified systemic risk as the risk of a single firm’s failure having substantial negative effects
on the broader economy.”); Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians:
Toward Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 627 n.27 (2012)
(“[T]he primary goal of the U.S. system of bank regulation and supervision is to ensure
solvency of banking organizations and to protect the banking industry from failure.”).
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING MANUAL:
CHARTERS
4
(2016),
http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-bytype/licensing-manuals/charters.pdf [http://perma.cc/VU2S-43J7].
See infra Part IV.A.
Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 3, at 1395.
For several examples, see infra notes 238–241.
See, e.g., Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1337 n.393 (2002).
See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 90 (2008).
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1061(a)(2)(A), 12
U.S.C. § 5581(b)(1)–(4), (6) (2012). I refer to this act elsewhere as the “Dodd-Frank Act.”
See id.
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intersection with fintech. Part III explains the stakes in calibrating competition
policy, including the opportunity for consumer welfare gains, expanded access
to credit for low-income households, and a safer banking system.
The heart of the Article, Part IV, outlines the institutional design flaws
in the current regulatory framework, and examines new potential locations
for competition leadership. One possibility, granting the CFPB competition
authority, would produce a “twin peaks” model with prudential regulation
separate from a single entity charged with both consumer protection and
competition.32 Another possibility, a new financial competition agency,
would yield a triple peaks model with separate regulators for competition,
consumer protection, and stability. Regardless of the model chosen, the Federal
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) should play a coordinating role to ensure
that stability remains part of the competition analysis. The conclusion briefly
considers other heavily regulated industries to which analogous institutional
analyses might apply, such as securities, telecommunications, and energy.

I.

THE FINTECH CHALLENGE TO BANKS

In 2015, Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan Chase, the largest U.S. bank,
wrote a letter to shareholders warning that “Silicon Valley is coming.”33 Fintech
brings together two of the most powerful industries, technology and finance, as
potential competitors and collaborators. This Part surveys fintech, provides a
definition, and assesses the evolving competitive dynamics between new and
traditional financial firms.
A.

Defining Fintech

From a product perspective, fintech services can be broken down into
those offering credit, processing payments, giving advice, managing assets,
issuing currencies, and helping with legal compliance. This Article focuses on
consumer services such as bank accounts, payments, financial advice, and loans.
These services are each worthy of separate sustained treatment beyond the

32.
33.

Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial Stability” in Financial Stability Oversight Council, 76
OHIO ST. L.J. 1087, 1140 (2015) (explaining the twin peaks model used in some countries).
JAMIE DIMON, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., DEAR FELLOW SHAREHOLDERS 29 (2015),
http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/investor-relations/document/JPMC-AR2014LetterToShareholders.pdf [http://perma.cc/7KJS-KKYH].
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distinctions drawn below, but my core thesis implicates all of them in important
ways.
An important institutional distinction is that between fintechs and
traditional financial firms. Fintech is used here to refer to the relatively new
category of companies whose business models are based on digital products.
The term leaves out legacy banks, like Citibank and Wells Fargo, which may
now offer similar products but whose services originally lacked a digital
component.
This definition does not preclude fintechs from operating as banks, but
most in the United States are neither banks nor bank holding companies.34
Since they do not have banking licenses, any money fintechs hold for consumers
must not be for deposits, but instead for other purposes—such as transferring or
lending. Fintechs are, however, clouding the very nature of what it means to be
a bank. PayPal, the biggest fintech focused on financial products, holds enough
money in its customers’ accounts to be the twentieth largest bank. Yet in the
United States, PayPal is not licensed as one. Consumers use legacy bank
accounts and credit cards to get money into their PayPal accounts.
Accountholders can then use PayPal to transfer money among individuals and
businesses. PayPal also offers loans through partner institutions and gives
financial advice. But PayPal’s nonbank status and subsequent lack of FDIC
deposit insurance means that if PayPal went bankrupt, consumers would likely
not get their money back.35
Fintechs can be of any size. Four of the ten largest U.S. companies, Google,
Apple, Amazon, and Facebook, all have built payment systems and made other
inroads into finance.36 Despite the participation of large technology companies,
the main drivers of fintech innovation have been the thousands of startups
attracting billions of dollars in investment each year. Startup business models
are novel, diverse, and shifting. One of the earliest fintech areas was peer-topeer lending, in which companies link individuals who have money to those
who want it.37 Most of the original peer-to-peer companies have already grown

34.
35.
36.
37.

This Article refers to banks and bank holding companies interchangeably, unless otherwise
specified. A bank holding company is “any company [that] has control over [a] bank.” See
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1).
See Telis Demos, As Industry Evolves, PayPal, Peers Rise Up, WALL STREET J., June 2, 2016, at
C1.
See Packin & Lev-Aretz, supra note 14, at 1233–37; Alice Uribe, ASIC’s Greg Medcraft
Predicts ‘The Crowd’ Will Destroy Banking Models, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Apr. 10, 2017, at
13.
See Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
445, 451 (2011).
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beyond their origins and now engage in more familiar “marketplace
lending.”38 They receive money from banks to lend to individuals, and their
innovations have spread to other areas, such as sophisticated analytic tools for
estimating borrowers’ creditworthiness.39
Unlike the other categories of consumer fintechs, advisory fintechs do not
need to directly receive any money from consumers to offer their basic product.
The goal of Credit Karma, NerdWallet, Mint, and other advisory fintechs is to
help people make all of their financial decisions through a single app.40 These
companies learn about users—with permission—by accessing personal bank
accounts, credit scores, credit card records, tax returns, and other similar
sources of financial information. Users then receive recommendations about
credit cards or mortgages with lower fees, savings accounts that pay higher rates,
and other products that better meet their needs.41
While the term “fintech” is used here to exclude traditional banks, all
major financial institutions have become highly technological. The leading
banks are each purchasing fintech startups, forming strategic partnerships, or
internally building whiz teams to design new products.42 JP Morgan Chase’s
Intelligent Solutions Group has over 200 analysts and data scientists and
produced about fifty technologies in 2015 alone.43 Goldman Sachs, which has
more engineers than Facebook or Twitter, is launching an online lender.44 In
light of Wall Street’s increasing launch of digital products and adoption of
artificial intelligence,45 regulating fintech amounts to regulating the future of
finance.
B.

Private Sector Institutional Dynamics

Fintechs could in theory pose a threat to traditional banks. Almost threequarters of millennials say they would prefer to receive their financial services
from technology companies such as Google and Amazon, rather than big

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Kathryn Judge, The Future of Direct Finance: The Diverging Paths of Peer-to-Peer Lending
and Kickstarter, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 603, 613 (2015).
See id. at 610–13.
See Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1278 (2017).
See id. at 1286.
See, e.g., id.; Kim S. Nash, Big Banks Balance FinTech Startup Partnerships With Internal
Innovation, WALL STREET J., Mar. 22, 2016, at B1.
See Nash, supra note 42.
See Douglas W. Arner et al., The Evolution of FinTech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm?, 47 GEO.
J. INT’L L. 1271, 1291 (2016); John Gapper, The Lenders of the Revolution Look Familiar, FIN.
TIMES, June 18, 2015, at 9.
See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Financial Industry, 65 ALA. L. REV. 567, 568 (2014).
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banks.46 Convenience, trust, and price all could play important roles in
driving customer switching. Individual users, including small businesses,
increasingly find dealing with big banks to be time-consuming and frustrating
compared to the ease of tailored startup apps.47 In recent years, consumers
have grown distrustful of large financial institutions, whose reputations have
been battered by subprime mortgage lending, the financial crisis, the LIBOR
scandal, and Wells Fargo opening millions of fake accounts in customers’
names.48
Innovation helps explain why publicly traded companies are disappearing
at a faster rate today than ever before—six times as fast as forty years ago.49
Online startups have even thrived in other heavily regulated industries, such as
transportation and gambling.50 Convenience and lower costs have driven some
of this success, and many fintechs offer similar advantages.51 Furthermore,
unlike some industries that Silicon Valley has invaded, finance lacks a
meaningful physical component. This makes the base products inherently
vulnerable to digital competition. Traditional banks’ infrastructures—including
their legacy information systems and physical branches—inhibit their ability
to rapidly respond to disruption.
Since Dimon’s 2015 warning, however, the dynamics between fintech and
traditional firms appear to have shifted. Entrepreneurs who started out wanting
to do to banks what Amazon did to retail have wound up licensing their
technology to banks.52 As one industry observer puts it: “What was once
perhaps an adversarial relationship has warmed . . . .”53 Many no longer see

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Christofer Trudeau & Carolan McLarney, How Can Banks Enhance International
Connectivity with Business Customers?: A Study of HBSC, IUP J. BUS. STRATEGY, June 2017, at
20, 26.
See Demos, supra note 35; Roger Freeman, For a New Business, Banks Aren’t the First Stop,
WALL STREET J., June 3, 2016, at C4.
See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to
Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1323, 1332 (2013); Telis Demos, Warburg Banks on
Fintech, WALL STREET J., May 2, 2016, at C1.
See Martin Reeves et al., The Biology of Corporate Survival, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.Feb. 2016,
at 46, 4647.
See Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV.
383, 383 (2017).
See infra Part III.B.
Nathaniel Popper, A Target Too Big to Nail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2017, at B1.
Bryan Yurcan, How Moven Went From ‘Breaking Banks’ to Breaking Bread With Them, AM.
BANKER (Sept. 2, 2016, 1:32 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/how-moven-wentfrom-breaking-banks-to-breaking-bread-with-them [http://perma.cc/2QZP-6EFE].
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an existential threat in fintech. Instead, they believe that “[i]t is most likely that
the small fintech companies will be subsumed” by large financial institutions.54
II.

THE COMPETITION SHORTCOMINGS

A given fintech’s decision of whether to challenge or join banks will
depend in part on whether regulations and market dynamics give it a real
chance to compete. Competition is extremely difficult to measure, and
economic models inadequately consider important factors, such as innovation.55
To assess the hypothesis that a lack of competition inhibits fintech, this Part
surveys the evidence related to entry barriers, customer switching,
anticompetitive prices, and the relative pace of U.S. innovation.
A.

Entry Barriers

When firms face excessive barriers to entering a market, competition can
stagnate, raising prices and lowering innovation.56 Although part of the
problem is simply the large amount of regulation,57 fintech has faced two
further entry barriers: traditional firms’ ability to block market access and the
difficulty in obtaining a federal bank license.
Legacy financial institutions can limit some fintechs’ operations through
control of data. Most notably, advisory fintechs rely on access to both personal
and general product data.58 Some banks’ response has been to block or limit
fintechs’ access to customer accounts, thereby making it harder for fintechs to
provide tailored advice.59 Legacy institutions can also block fintechs from
collecting online product information by using laws never intended for such a

54.
55.

56.
57.

58.
59.

See Dennis K. Berman, The Game: The Existential Crisis That’s Stalking Banks, WALL STREET
J., May 31, 2016, at C1.
See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, A Unified Framework for Competition Policy and Innovation
Policy, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 163, 164 (2014) (“Innovation . . . remains a topic that is
viewed as too speculative by the enforcement agencies to serve as a justification for
moderating penalties.”). Measuring harm has also become more difficult as online
platforms have transformed markets. John M. Newman, Complex Antitrust Harm in
Platform Markets, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., May 2017, at 52.
See, e.g., Hemphill & Wu, supra note 7, at 1185.
Internet startups originally shied away from finance because heavy banking regulations
are “the antithesis of Silicon Valley’s just-do-it culture.” Marc Hochstein, Innovator of
the Year: CBW Bank’s Suresh Ramamurthi, AM. BANKER (Dec. 17, 2015, 2:54 PM),
http://www.americanbanker.com/news/innovator-of-the-year-cbw-bankssureshramamurthi.
See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Van Loo, supra note 40, at 1278.
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purpose, including trespass to chattel, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,60
and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.61 As a result, advisory fintechs cannot
on their own provide comprehensive financial advice to their users. In order to
access crucial data, fintechs may need to prioritize big banks’ interests over
helping consumers switch.
Some legacy firms can also limit market access through their dominant
market positions. Over 99 percent of all credit card transactions run through
the Visa, American Express, Mastercard, and Discover networks.62 Many
commentators have documented credit card companies’ ability to engage in
exclusionary conduct, such as vertical restraint clauses that prevent merchants
from using other payment methods.63 Although credit card companies may not
be able to use those same tactics against payment fintechs, their strong market
positions could enable them to deploy other tactics. They have, for instance,
instituted “Honor All Cards” rules requiring merchants to accept their
contactless payments as a condition of accepting plastic cards. These rules
arguably “foreclose entry to those digital wallets that . . . do not use the credit
card networks for payments.”64
The second major category of entry barriers comes not from business
conduct, but from government gatekeepers that issue licenses. Federal
banking licenses are important in part because they give banks preemption
from many state laws. The burden of complying with fifty different states’
laws and bank examination processes would be heavy. For example, to move
funds on their own as nonbanks, fintechs would need to obtain money
transfer licenses in each state.65 Preemption is also becoming increasingly
meaningful as some states—especially those with many traditional financial
institutions, such as New York and Connecticut—erect licensing barriers

60.
61.

62.
63.
64.
65.

Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 and 28
U.S.C.).
Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012); See
James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2007);
Maureen A. O’Rourke, Shaping Competition on the Internet: Who Owns Product and Pricing
Information?, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1965, 1972–75 (2000).
See Felix B. Chang, Financial Market Bottlenecks and the “Openness” Mandate, 23 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 69, 69 n.4 (2015).
See, e.g., Benjamin Edelman & Julian Wright, Price Coherence and Excessive Intermediation,
130 Q.J. ECON. 1283, 1283, 1311 (2015); Hemphill & Wu, supra note 7; Levitin, supra note
83.
Adam Levitin, Pandora’s Digital Box: The Promise and Perils Of Digital Wallets, 166 U.
PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2018) (manuscript at 1).
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1960. Preemption from state laws is also valued because national bank
loans are exempted from state usury laws. See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d
246, 250 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016).
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targeted at blocking fintech startups.66 Finally, bank licenses provide the
ability to receive customer deposits, which can be used to originate a loan or
other credit product at a lower cost.
Some fintechs surely decide not to seek bank licenses out of a strategic
choice between bank and nonbank regulation.67 Still, those wanting to
compete head-on with banks have limited prospects because the extension of
new banking licenses has slowed to a near halt.68 A rare fintech entrepreneur
who went through the license application process was rejected multiple times
and endured a much lengthier timeline than would a traditional bank.69
Although some regulatory caution is warranted for new business models, a
freeze in licensing is counter to market interests and may ultimately increase
systemic risk.70
Amazon did not need help from Walmart, Target, and other retailers to
sell directly to consumers. Uber did not need existing taxi companies, nor did
Airbnb need existing hotels, to operate.71 In contrast, entry barriers have so far
largely meant that fintechs “are not going to get anywhere unless they find a
federally chartered bank. . . . The banks are holding the cards.”72
B.

Limited Consumer Switching

Consumers’ ability to find and switch to the best products is vital for
competition. Fintechs promise to improve this process significantly,73 but
transaction costs are high for financial products such as credit cards and loans.
Costs include the time needed to understand complex financial products, wait
for the results of applications, and fill out lengthy forms to open and close
accounts. Nearly half of home buyers consider only one mortgage quote, and
are slow to refinance even when considerably lower rates are available.74

66.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See Joseph Young, Without Unified, Federal Regulations for Digital Currencies, the U.S. Risks
MAG.
(Aug.
1,
2016,
5:25
PM),
Falling
Behind,
BITCOIN
http://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/without-unified-federal-regulations-for-digitalcurrencies-the-u-s-risks-falling-behind-1470086728 [http://perma.cc/47GD-6LXM].
Cf. Lawrence G. Baxter, Adaptive Financial Regulation and Regtech: A Concept Article on
Realistic Protection for Victims of Bank Failures, 66 DUKE L.J. 567, 578–79 (2016).
See Rachel Witkowski, Lawmakers Demand FDIC Approve New Banks to Prevent Systemic
Risk, WALL STREET J., July 13, 2016, at B1. On recent developments, see infra Part IV.B.1.
See Hochstein, supra note 57.
See Witkowski, supra note 68; infra Part III.A.
See Pollman & Barry, supra note 50.
See Hochstein, supra note 57 (quoting fintech consultant Melissa Craig).
See infra Part III.B.
See, e.g., Yoon-Ho Alex Lee & K. Jeremy Ko, Consumer Mistakes in the Mortgage Market:
Choosing Unwisely Versus Not Switching Wisely, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 417, 417 (2012); see also,
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The credit card industry further illustrates financial products’ stickiness.
After consumers sign up for a credit card with a teaser rate, most never switch
even when they would save money by doing so.75 Even when consumers
complete lengthy applications, about 70 percent are denied.76 The need to wait
for a new credit card in the mail, then cancel the old account, and then activate
the new one by calling introduces further obstacles. Economists have found that
substantial credit card switching costs enhance financial institutions’ market
power and contribute to “the failure of competition in the credit card market.”77
C.

Anticompetitive Prices

Perfect competition is a theoretical concept and not expected of actual
markets. Instead, competitive markets should push firms to “price near a
measure of their costs.”78 Prices above this level, though not illegal and
extremely difficult to measure precisely,79 can indicate markets are not
“sufficiently competitive.”80 Numerous studies of consumer finance prices
indicate insufficient competition.
The Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure Act of
2009 (CARD Act)81 set limits on practices, such as certain fees, that had brought
credit card companies billions of dollars in revenues.82 In a more competitive
market, credit card companies would have been expected to respond to the
elimination of those fees by increasing other fees, thereby passing the costs of
the new regulations on to consumers.83 Instead, the CARD Act is estimated to

75.
76.
77.
78.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

e.g., Richard Cordray, Foreword: Consumer Protection in the Financial Marketplace, 9 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV 307, 323 (2015).
See Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The Card Act and Beyond, 97 CORNELL
L. REV. 967, 999–1000, 1007 (2012) (summarizing research on switching credit cards).
See Finish Rich & Credit Karma, BREAKING BANKS (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.breaking
banks.com/finish-rich-credit-karma [http://perma.cc/C6FW-4N86].
See Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM.
ECON. REV. 50, 68–72 (1991); Victor Stango, Pricing With Consumer Switching Costs:
Evidence From the Credit Card Market, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 475 (2002).
Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting Chairman, FTC, Address at the GCR Live 6th Annual
Antitrust Law Leaders Forum: The FTC’s Path Ahead 1 (Feb. 3, 2017),
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1070123/gcr_theftc_path_ahead.pdf [http://perma .cc/3VDV-2LSB].
Baxter, supra note 4, at 787 (“[M]easuring both competitive performance and efficiencies is
an exceptionally difficult empirical exercise in which there may never be clear answers . . . .”).
See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 75, at 978, 1000.
Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C. (2012)).
See Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 75, at 1000.
See id. at 967; Sumit Agarwal et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products: Evidence
From Credit Cards, 130 Q.J. ECON. 111, 111, 115 (2015). Legal scholars examining
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have saved consumers $11.9 billion.84 Related studies have found that banks
were unable to pass on about $14 billion from the Durbin Amendment in the
Dodd-Frank Act, which lowered banks’ revenues from interchange fees.85
Other studies have looked at the price effects of concentrated ownership.
Among the largest banks, the same three institutional investors own 16.7
percent of JP Morgan Chase, 15.9 percent of Bank of America, 16.4 percent of
Citigroup, and 14.8 percent of Wells Fargo.86 A recent study found a “causal
link from [this horizontal ownership] to higher prices for banking products.”87
The precise anticompetitive mechanism requires further examination, but
other empirical analyses have concluded that investors “might be able to exert
forms of power over the companies held in their portfolios.”88
Horizontal ownership concentration can be also found among fintech
startups, which are typically funded by a small group of wealthy investors—
often individuals, but also venture capitalists, private equity firms, and hedge
funds.89 Additionally, large banks hold ownership stakes in fintech. The largest
U.S. bank by assets, JP Morgan Chase, has invested in many fintech startups that
provide competing products.90 Since big banks’ purchases of small
startups can provide crucial funding, economies of scale, and geographic
reach to new products, it would be premature to conclude that horizontal

84.
85.

86.
87.
88.

89.
90.

competition in the credit card industry have more found “significant evidence
of . . . illegal activit[y].” Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 3, at 1391; see also Adam J.
Levitin, Priceless? The Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 55 UCLA L.
REV. 1321, 1324 (2008).
Agarwal et al., supra note 83, at 111, 115.
See Benjamin Kay et al., Bank Profitability and Debit Card Interchange Regulation: Bank
Responses to the Durbin Amendment 2, 11 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series
Working
Paper
No.
77,
2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2503652.
See José Azar et al., Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership 51 (IESE Bus. Sch. Pub.Private Sector Research Ctr., Working Paper No. WP-1169-E, 2017), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2969751 (listing ownership by Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street).
See José Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition (July 23, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 2710252.
See Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-concentration
of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 298–302, 323 (2017).
When multiple firms in an industry have the same owners, those firms may have less
incentive to take profits away from each other. See Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding,
129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1267–68 (2016).
See, e.g., George Walker, Financial Technology Law—A New Beginning and a New Future, 50
INT’L LAW. 137, 176 (2017).
Melissa Mittelman, JPMorgan to Adopt Fintech Startups With In-House Incubator,
BLOOMBERG (June 30, 2016, 11:07 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2016-0630/jpmorgan-to-adopt-fintech-startups-with-in-house-incubator [http://perma.cc/6R7DYMT8].
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ownership of fintech startups harms markets. Nonetheless, it is an area of
potential concern.
Other studies have estimated the pricing effects of industry consolidation.
Between 2000 and 2010 alone, the largest five banks increased their share of U.S.
financial assets from 30 percent to about 50 percent.91 Economists have
connected market consolidation to lower deposit rates received by consumers
on their bank account balances,92 as well as higher rates paid by consumers for
personal loans93 and mortgages.94 Mergers drove much of this consolidation.95
A recent economics study provides additional perspective on prices.
Technological advances in most other industries have significantly reduced the
costs of products. But by some measures financial services cost the same today
as in the Gilded Age, when banks had great market power and before computers
existed.96
D.

International Technology Gap

Adoption of consumer financial technologies has proceeded more slowly
in the United States than in many other countries. Mobile banking in the
United States is reportedly years behind global counterparts.97 Almost one billion
Chinese consumers deposit money, make payments, and transfer funds on their

91.

92.
93.
94.

95.
96.
97.

Robert M. Adams, Consolidation and Merger Activity in the United States Banking Industry
From 2000 Through 2010, at 10 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series Working
Paper No. 2012-51, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=2193886; see
also Charles W. Murdock, The Big Banks: Background Deregulation, Financial Innovation,
and “Too Big to Fail”, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 505, 541–42 (2012).
See, e.g., Robin A. Prager & Timothy H. Hannan, Do Substantial Horizontal Mergers
Generate Significant Price Effects? Evidence From the Banking Industry, 46 J. INDUS. ECON.
433, 433 (1998).
See, e.g., Charles Kahn et al., Bank Consolidation and the Dynamics of Consumer Loan
Interest Rates, 78 J. BUS. 99, 100 (2005).
See, e.g., Allen N. Berger et al., The Consolidation of the Financial Services Industry: Causes,
Consequences, and Implications for the Future, 23 J. BANKING & FIN. 135, 145–48 (1999);
David Scharfstein & Adi Sunderam, Market Power in Mortgage Lending and the
Transmission of Monetary Policy 18 (Sept. 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.people.hbs.edu/dscharfstein/Mortgage-Market-Power_20140907.pdf
[http://perma.cc/V5LR-ZKMG]. Findings on concentration and financial service pricing
are sometimes mixed. See, e.g., Isil Erel, The Effect of Bank Mergers on Loan Prices: Evidence
From the United States, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1068, 1070 (2011).
See infra Part IV.A.3.
Thomas Philippon, The FinTech Opportunity 6 (July 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~tphilipp/papers/FinTech.pdf [https://perma.cc/AW74-PB8W].
See, e.g., Hochstein, supra note 57.

248

65 UCLA L. R EV. 232 (2018)

phones, and Chinese fintechs have a comparable number of customers as do
legacy banks.98
The gap between the United States and some countries may result from
the United States having a basic financial infrastructure that is sufficiently
functional, which makes improvements less necessary. That sufficiency does
not explain the gap with European countries, such as Germany, with
comparably functional infrastructures.99 In Australia, contactless payments
already account for almost 40 percent of the value of credit card transactions,100
compared to a miniscule portion of the U.S. market.101
Cross-country comparisons are limited due to the many variables for
which it is impossible to control. Still, U.S. companies have led global digital
innovation in most industries, launching the first major search engines, social
networks, and transportation platforms. Google, Facebook, Uber, and other
technology companies leveraged their leadership with U.S. consumers to
achieve similar success abroad.102 The gap between the United States and global
fintechs is especially striking because it is the inverse of how other digital
markets have progressed.
III.

THE STAKES

This Part focuses on the stakes of developing effective competition policy
in light of the opportunities and challenges presented by fintech.
Understanding the stakes is important because policymakers and regulators can
contribute to competitive shortcomings in myriad ways. In addition to the
outright blocking of fintechs discussed above,103 “the current Too Big To Fail
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101.
102.

103.

See James T. Areddy & Alyssa Abkowitz, What Is A Bank? The Future of Banks on Display
in China, WALL STREET J., June 2, 2016, at C1.
Digital Bank or Digital Banking?, BREAKING BANKS (June 18, 2015),
http://www.breakingbanks.com/digital-bank-or-digital-banking [http://perma.cc/ DF26VJHK] (quoting a German executive as saying, “Whenever I log in into the traditional
banks’ services [in the United States], I am traveling in time fifteen to twenty years
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See Madeleine Heffernan, $110bn: Australia’s Contactless Boom, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD
(Aug. 8, 2016), http://www.smh.com.au/business/retail/110bn-australias-contactless-boom20160805-gqmg7j.html [http://perma.cc/4KR6-FHLY].
Cf. Tripp Mickle, Apple Pay Struggles to Gain Traction, WALL STREET J., Apr. 6, 2017, at B4
(detailing the “disappointing” usage of Apple’s contactless payment system).
See, e.g., Tom Fairless, Europe vs. U.S. Tech Giants: Amazon, Google and Facebook in the
Spotlight at Davos, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 20, 2015, 1:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/europe-vs-u-s-tech-giants-amazon-google-and-facebook-still-in-the-spotlight1421777989.
See supra Part II.A.
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policy . . . convey[s] an inappropriate and inefficient competitive advantage to
big banks; it provides them with artificially cheap funding . . . .”104 Also,
regulators’ merger decisions have in part determined the size of big banks.105
These competition decisions are not made in isolation. The policy
designer must decide how to allocate limited resources among different
regulatory goals, and must consider the possibility that pursuing one mission will
undermine others. The point here is not that competition should win out over
other major financial regulatory goals that currently receive greater attention,
such as consumer protection and stability. An understanding of the stakes of
competition is crucial to informed decisions about whether and how to
advance competition in light of those other goals. As this discussion will show,
competition policy is important not only in its own right for the economy, but
also for how it can advance consumer protection and stability.
A.

Financial Stability

Competition policy can help lessen systemic risk. Consider, for instance,
what would happen if fintechs were unable to truly compete with traditional
banks, whether due to laws or anticompetitive conduct by businesses. A bank’s
main options are to develop fintech internally, establish strategic partnerships
with a fintech, or purchase a fintech.
Each of these paths would be distorted by the fintechs’ inability to operate
independently. Internally developing technology becomes more feasible for the
bank because any fintech must find an existing bank. After finding a bank, it
would need to integrate operations with an outdated structure. This
dependence on banks’ legacy systems introduces a delay. Due to the delay,
banks choosing to develop fintech internally would have more time to recruit
talent and perhaps even reverse engineer a fintech app’s interface.
Additionally, the market value of the fintech would be lower because its
standalone growth potential would be limited. This would disincentivize
entrepreneurs from launching fintechs. It also would make it easier for banks to
hire top talent away from fintechs, which would have fewer resources to offer
employees, including a lower upside for any employee stock options.
Negotiations for strategic partnerships would similarly put fintechs in a weaker
bargaining position than if they had a standalone option.

104. Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 3, at 1374; see also Thomas Philippon, Has the US Finance
Industry Become Less Efficient? On the Theory and Measurement of Financial
Intermediation, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1408, 1434 (2015).
105. See infra Part IV.A.1.b
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It would be difficult for an observer to know what precise effect
competition policy was having. Banks would be competing with each other,
rapidly developing innovative products or acquiring other firms, which could
be seen as signs of vibrant competition. In reality, it could simply be that laws
restricting licenses or access to data were enabling incumbents to free ride off of
challengers’ innovation. Or it could be that big banks’ ownership stake in
various fintechs was shaping product development in directions less likely to
disrupt banks.
What would be the stability implications? Technology companies often
obtain market shares over 60 percent, considerably higher than the leading
banks today, which have closer to 10 percent of deposits.106 Extreme
concentration in digital products can result from network effects, which occur
when a product is more valuable as more people use it, as is the case for
Facebook or a telephone.107 The extent of network effects in various fintech
markets remains to be seen but some would be likely.108
In this scenario, the leading banks would likely benefit from any network
effects generated by fintech. Even five or ten percentage points of additional
market share would make what are already seen as systemically risky financial
institutions more dangerous. Inept competition policy would thus compromise
stability by failing to allow fintechs to compete in the first place, thereby
ensuring that banks can grow significantly.
An alternative reality can be imagined in which fintechs gain success without
depending on banks. They might, for instance, successfully lobby for a better
licensing regime or rules that give them access to data. As banks lose customers
and anticompetitive profits, they would become smaller. If banking agencies
were doing their jobs, the loss of customers would unfold in an orderly manner.
Fintech competition could thereby lessen systemic risk, which is no small feat
106. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
107. See John M. Newman, The Myth of Free, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 28–29); Packin & Lev-Aretz, supra note 14, at 1216, 1221; Christopher S.
Yoo, When Antitrust Met Facebook, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1147 (2012).
108. Hilary J. Allen, $=€=Bitcoin?, 76 MD. L. REV. 877, 932–33 (2017) (concluding that distributed
ledger technologies could enhance the concentration of the largest banks through network
effects). Network effects vary by industry and do not necessarily justify antitrust
intervention. See Yoo, supra note 107, at 1161. In finance, having more data points has
already enabled lenders to make better risk predictions. See Lauren E. Willis,
Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65
MD. L. REV. 707, 719–20, 807–08 (2006). Better predictions drive better pricing for low-risk
individuals, which attracts more customers. More customers mean more data. This positive
feedback loop could raise barriers to entry by affording incumbents potentially
unreproducible advantages. See Howard A. Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and
Competition Policy for the Internet, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1686–87 (2013).
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given the bipartisan concerns about big banks and the lack of consensus about
how to shrink them.109
Independent fintechs create their own manner of threat to stability. Over
time, an independent fintech could become so giant and interconnected that its
failure could destabilize the financial system, particularly if it held a license
allowing it to accept federally insured deposits. Or an advisory fintech with 60
percent of the market could give similar advice to large numbers of
consumers, creating unpredictable movements.
To be sure, great
concentration is not necessary for innovation to destabilize. Financial
institutions did not need to capture such high portions of credit default swaps
for those instruments to contribute to the 2008 financial crisis.110 Fragmented
traders’ automated algorithms combined in unexpected ways to wipe out a
trillion dollars in stock market value in only a few seconds during the 2010
“Flash Crash.”111 Nonetheless, concentrated fintech markets could create
additional dangers from coordinated mass financial movements or systemically
important fintech institutions.
Future crises are unpredictable. The main point is that competition policy
can be a valuable ally for financial stability in the fintech era. Ignoring
competition policy can lead to missed opportunities for reducing familiar risks
in the short term and can create new threats in the long term.
B.

Consumer Welfare

The “excessive rents and poor overall efficiency” in finance can harm
consumers and produce a deadweight loss for the economy.112 The magnitude
of loss from financial inefficiency is unknown, but finance accounts for about 7
percent of U.S. GDP113 and 25 to 50 percent of all corporate profits.114
Economists have recently found substantial innovation competition benefits in
other heavily regulated industries. Recent studies concluded that new airline

109. On existing views of how to approach large banks, see, for example, Levitin, supra note 17, at
438; Michael C. Bender & Damian Paletta, Trump Moves to Undo Dodd-Frank—White
House Says Banks Burdened by Rules Added After Financial Crisis, WALL STREET J., Feb. 3,
2017, at A1.
110. Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic Risk: Why Centralized
Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49, 49
(2011).
111. Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461, 498 (2015).
112. Philippon, supra note 96, at 10.
113. Financial Services Spotlight, SELECTUSA, http://www.selectusa.gov/financial-servicesindustry-united-states [http://perma.cc/ML5N-C68V].
114. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 110 (2011).
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entrants’ leaner business models lowered ticket costs by 28 percent and that Uber
improved driver utilization by 50 percent.115
Fintech has the potential to do the same for various consumer credit
products. Whereas traditional lenders’ expenses are about 5 to 7 percent of
outstanding loans, startups have reportedly gotten that number closer to 2
percent.116 They also charge on average four times less for transferring more
moderate sums of money than do banks.117
In assessing these reports, it would be ideal to factor in the differential costs
of regulation, and it is possible that some startups are setting unprofitably low
prices to gain market share. But lower fintech prices are at least partly driven by
efficiency-improving factors. Digital intermediaries have begun to make it easier
for borrowers to compare the price of mortgages, which the CFPB has
recognized as advancing its consumer protection goals.118 Others have
increased the speed at which payment accounts can be opened to a matter of
minutes, and the time to process a loan from a week to seventy-two hours.119 If
these innovations expand broadly, the reduction in switching costs could not
only improve market efficiency, but also save individual consumers
thousands of dollars annually on credit card and mortgage payments.120
Disintermediation is another potential driver of increased consumer
welfare. Payment processing fintechs have successfully removed expensive
banks as intermediaries in other countries.121 One disintermediation
innovation is blockchain, a distributed ledger technology that some believe
will transform finance as fundamentally as the Internet transformed
communications.122 The technology’s structure makes it usable by anyone
sufficiently skilled, potentially enabling even transacting parties with limited

115. On airline entrants, see John Kwoka et al., From the Fringe to the Forefront: Low Cost
Carriers and Airline Price Determination, 48 REV. INDUS. ORG. 247, 249 (2016). On Uber, see
Judd Cramer & Alan B. Krueger, Disruptive Change in the Taxi Business: The Case of Uber,
106 AM. ECON. REV. 177, 177 (2016).
116. See The Fintech Revolution, supra note 15, at 25; see also Christopher K. Odinet, Consumer
Bitcredit and Marketplace Lending, ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
117. See Sofia, FinTech Is Pushing Banks Out of the Remittance Business, LET’S TALK PAYMENTS
(Feb.
10,
2016),
http://letstalkpayments.com/fintech-is-pushing-banks-out-of-theremittance-business [http://perma.cc/WD2A-ZCU8].
118. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, LEVERAGING TECHNOLOGY TO EMPOWER MORTGAGE
CONSUMERS AT CLOSING 11 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201508_cfpb_leveragingtechnology-to-empower-mortgage-consumers-at-closing.pdf [http://perma.cc/2Z3W-PRUZ].
119. See, e.g., Odinet, supra note 116.
120. See supra Part II.A.
121. See A Penny Here, A Penny There, ECONOMIST, May 9, 2015, at 14.
122. See, e.g., Gilly Wright, Will Blockchain Enable Better Banking?, GLOBAL FINANCE, July 2015, at
40.
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resources to bypass the traditional banking system to transfer funds.123
There is reason to be skeptical of some of the claims about likely gains from
blockchain.124 Nonetheless, it presents a potential mechanism for removing
inefficient intermediaries, assuming those intermediaries are protected neither by
law nor by anticompetitive conduct.
C.

International Competitiveness

Less efficient and innovative U.S. financial services are problematic not
only in isolation, but also from an international perspective. Scholars and
regulators have inconclusively debated whether banks need to be big to
maintain their international competitiveness.125 Less well-recognized is how a
lack of domestic competition may undermine U.S. financial firms’ global
competitiveness. Foreign financial firms may gain an edge by being subject to
greater competition in their home markets, thereby being forced to innovate
more and operate leanly. This creates two potential problems. First, reduced
domestic competitiveness may make the United States less able to enter foreign
markets. The U.S. economy has benefited in recent years from billions of
dollars in revenues earned abroad by Google and other leading digital
companies.126 Given the growing portion of the global economy taken up by
finance, the fintech lag could constitute a large-scale missed opportunity for
U.S. firms to strengthen the economy by bringing in revenues earned abroad.
Second, in the long term, American financial firms may become more
vulnerable to international competition even in domestic markets. Although
U.S. licenses can shield banks from foreign fintech challengers today, distributed
ledger technologies may change this. Americans are already increasingly using
Bitcoin, Ethereum, and other unregulated virtual currencies based on
blockchain technology.127 Much is unknown about how such technologies will
develop, and the trust offered by a governmentally overseen financial
system may prove difficult to replicate.128 If, however, an era of wide-open
global finance arrives, U.S. financial institutions could find themselves suddenly
123. See Adam J. Levitin, Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 443 n.316
(2016); Magnuson, supra note 10.
124. For instance, the skills required to use it mean that intermediaries will still be needed. See,
e.g., Levitin, supra note 123, at 443 n.316.
125. See Baxter, supra note 4, at 816–17.
126. See Fairless, supra note 102.
127. See Nathaniel Popper, In Digital Coins, Bypassing Rules as You Get Rich, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
2017, at A1.
128. See Catherine Martin Christopher, The Bridging Model: Exploring the Roles of Trust and
Enforcement in Banking, Bitcoin, and the Blockchain, 17 NEV. L.J. 139 (2016).

254

65 UCLA L. R EV. 232 (2018)

exposed to international competition as never before. Without U.S. regulators
to insulate them, U.S. financial institutions made soft by lesser competition
would be more prone to lose significant market share to foreign financial
institutions than they would be if domestic markets were more competitive.
D.

Distributional Implications

About 7 percent of all U.S. households and 18 percent of African
American and Latino households are unbanked, which means they lack
access to a federally insured bank account.129 The unbanked pay
considerably more for financial services, such as four dollars to cash a
twenty-dollar check.130
Among many contributors,131 it can be
disproportionately expensive for banks to process smaller transactions. The
time spent approving and processing a loan, for instance, is similar
regardless of loan size.132 Access is further impaired because payday lenders,
pawn shops, and other fringe lenders serving the unbanked often do not give
information to credit reporting agencies.133 The lack of a credit history in turn
diminishes access to low-cost credit alternatives, a problem “exacerbated by the
strong interaction of race and class in the communities where fringe operators
have a significant presence.”134
In theory, fintechs’ lower operating costs and automation offer a partial
solution by making it cheaper to provide services for smaller value loans and
bank accounts. Additionally, fintechs have developed new mechanisms for
predicting the creditworthiness of low-income households, including those who
lack credit records.135 Some fintechs are even using their networks to help
recently unemployed borrowers of various wealth levels find jobs, making
borrowers more likely to pay back loans.136

129. See Yuka Hayashi, Ranks of the ‘Unbanked’ Decline, WALL STREET J., Sept. 8, 2016, at C1.
130. Nathaniel Popper, Helping the Unbanked, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2016, at F10.
131. For broader treatments of inequality in financial services, see MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE
COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP (2017); Michael S. Barr,
Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121 (2004); and Rory Van Loo, Consumer Law as Tax
Alternative, 96 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
132. See, e.g., Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1283,
1336 (2014).
133. Richard R.W. Brooks, Credit Past Due, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 994, 997 (2006).
134. See id.
135. See Mayank Jain, Fintech Tracker: Your Phone and Facebook Account Can Help Improve
Your
Credit
Score,
BLOOMBERGQUINT
(Jan.
28,
2017,
3:34
AM),
http://www.bloombergquint.com/business/2017/01/28/fintech-tracker-your-phone-andfacebook-account-can-help-improve-your-credit-score [http://perma.cc/XWX2-8VG2].
136. See So Far, So Good; SoFi, ECONOMIST, Jan. 16, 2016 at 83.
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Outside of the United States, in areas with less developed financial
infrastructures and higher fintech adoption rates, mobile banking has
reportedly extended financial access to millions of previously unbanked
persons.137 In probably the most comprehensive study to date, the Federal
Reserve concluded that online lenders extended access to credit where it was
insufficiently available.138 Account-level data also indicated that two fintechs,
Lending Club and Y-14M, had used “alternative information sources [to allow]
some borrowers who would be classified as subprime by traditional criteria to be
slotted into ‘better’ loan grades and therefore get lower priced credit.”139 At a
minimum, assuming appropriate consumer protection laws are in place,
innovation has the potential to reduce financial inequality.
IV.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK

The discussion so far has shown that the U.S. economy may be poised to
miss out on significant gains, and incur new risks, without strong competition
policy. Realizing the full benefits of innovation would mean preventing
anticompetitive mergers, cracking down on exclusionary conduct, and
extending appropriate licensing.
All branches of government have a role to play in competition
regulation. Legislatures would ideally update outdated statutes, but they
lack expertise and the ability to act quickly as markets develop.140 Courts
provide important checks,141 but are less equipped to develop market-wide

137. See, e.g., Catherine Martin Christopher, Mobile Banking: The Answer for the Unbanked in
America?, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 221, 233–40 (2015).
138. Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, Fintech Lending: Financial Inclusion, Risk Pricing, And
Alternative Information (Research Dep’t, Nat’l Res. Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 1717,
2017),
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-anddata/publications/working-papers/2017/wp17-17.pdf.
139. Id. at 0.
140. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 29, at 84–85.
141. In the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency’s (OCC) broad rule that would have shielded banks from
state enforcement of law. See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519 (2009). The
Court also intervened following the passage of the 1956 Bank Holding Company Act. Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1841–1852 (2012)). In that act, Congress “relegated the Department of Justice to
an advisory role” in bank mergers. Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 3, at 1395 n.80. The
Supreme Court, however, stepped in to declare that effort inconsistent with the Sherman
Antitrust Act. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 355 (1963); Macey &
Holdcroft, supra note 3, at 1395 n.80.
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solutions or take preventative steps.142 Consequently, an administrative
agency should play a lead role in not only enforcing existing laws but also
developing and advocating new competition policies.
A.

Existing Agencies’ Inadequacies

Congress designed significant parts of the financial regulatory framework
in the wake of economic disasters such as the Great Depression of the 1930s and
the Great Recession of the late 2000s. This context means that preventing the
next crisis was at the top of legislators’ minds. Major legislation emphasized
financial stability and, to a lesser extent, consumer protection when it was a
visible part of the preceding crisis. But reformers paid scant attention to
competition because it was not a salient factor in the preceding economic
turmoil.143
Despite greater attention in recent years to systemic risk, regulators still
emphasize a narrower mechanism for stability—the safety and soundness of
large financial institutions.144 Bank failures during formative crises have caused
great panic and been seen as presenting the risk of economic collapse. The
connection between that institutional focus and competition is not well
understood, and the literature is divided as to when and whether competition

142. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 29, at 75 (“[I]n the field of regulation of consumer credit
markets, there is substantial consensus that [single-plaintiff] litigation is ill suited to produce
the most effective results.”). The lack of empirical studies of public versus private antitrust
enforcement hinders any debate about their optimal degree of substitutability and
complementarity. See D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1055, 1081–84 (2010). They are also highly deferential to agencies on
banking matters. See, e.g., Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 403 (1987) (ruling that
the OCC’s construction of the National Bank Act is entitled to “great weight”); Sec. Indus.
Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207, 221 (1984) (holding that the
Federal Reserve Board’s determination that banks could acquire stock brokerage firms
without violating Glass-Steagall “deserves the deference normally accorded the Board’s
construction of the banking laws”). Furthermore, private plaintiffs are regularly denied
standing under major financial competition legislation. See Mitria Wilson, Protecting the
Public’s Interests: A Consumer-Focused Reassessment of the Standard for Bank Mergers and
Acquisitions, 130 BANKING L.J. 350, 352 (2013) (summarizing the results from every
published case in which a consumer plaintiff challenged a financial regulator under bankingcompetition statutes and concluding standing was always denied).
143. See Chang, supra note 62, at 70; Samuel N. Weinstein, When Systemic Risk Meets Antitrust:
Dodd-Frank’s Impact on Competitive Markets in the Wake of an Economic Crisis, 21 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 286, 292, 289 (2016).
144. See infra notes 190191 and accompanying text; see also Hilary J. Allen, The SEC as
Financial Stability Regulator, J. CORP. L. (forthcoming) (discussing recent shifts).
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harms financial stability.145 Regardless of the objective reality, however,
regulators focused on bank safety and soundness may view competition as a
threat to their primary mandate. These two themes—insufficient attention to
competition and overemphasizing the survival of big banks—permeate the
institutional design flaws that undercut financial innovation.
1.

Banking Agencies: Limited Motivation

The Federal Reserve, FDIC, and OCC—known as “prudential regulators”—
are the leading bank safety and soundness and competition regulators. Safety
and soundness regulation is not intended to promote bank profits. Instead,
regulators require banks to have enough capital to withstand a sudden market
downturn and prohibit them from excessively risky behavior. Scholars writing
on topics other than competition policy have nonetheless argued that the
regulatory ethos of vigilantly making sure banks do not collapse drives
regulators to seek ways to increase bank profits.146 A profitable bank is, after all,
less likely to fail than an unprofitable one. The resulting mission tension between
competition and stability plays out in decisions regarding both licensing and
antitrust.
a.

Licensing

At the federal level, the OCC licenses banks.147 Its responsibilities include
deciding which banks can obtain new licenses and interpreting the scope of
existing licenses. Officially, the OCC is supposed to consider how its granting of
licenses can promote competition.148 In reality, the agency has used its licensing
authority mostly in ways that would increase the revenues of those banks that
already have licenses.

145. See Ioannis Kokkoris, Competition vs. Stability in the Aftermath of the Crisis in the UK, 59
ANTITRUST BULL. 31, 32 (2014).
146. See, e.g., Baradaran, supra note 132, at 1307 (“[R]egulators felt that in order to protect bank
safety, they needed to assure their profitability.”); Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 29, at 90
(equating bank regulators’ safety and soundness mission with bank profitability); Roberta S.
Karmel, An Orderly Liquidation Authority Is Not the Solution to Too-Big-to-Fail, 6 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 2, 12–13 (2011) (“[R]egulators . . . have been complicit facilitators of
bank growth because they believe that size makes banks sounder.”).
147. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) can essentially veto state and federal
licenses by refusing to grant deposit insurance. See, e.g., Bob Solomon, The Fall (and Rise?)
of Community Banking: The Continued Importance of Local Institutions, 2 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 945, 965–66 (2012).
148. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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The OCC has many times expanded the scope of activities allowed by its
licensed banks. It interpreted the National Bank Act149 as allowing banks to
offer discount brokerage services,150 and Glass-Steagall151 as not preventing
banks from buying, selling, and dealing in mortgage-backed securities.152 The
OCC has in other ways prioritized banks’ profits over other financial law goals,
including an attempt to shield banks from state prosecution for racially
discriminatory lending.153
The OCC’s bank-oriented exercise of licensing authority can be seen in its
approach to fintech. The OCC has been slow either to offer fintechs traditional
bank licenses or to develop a new category.154 As a result, the OCC indirectly
made fintech startups depend on banks to provide many basic financial
services.155 The OCC’s head until 2017, Thomas Curry, even made this policy
explicit by initially instructing his employees to find ways “to think about how
we can act as a bridge [between traditional banks and fintech firms] or a
clearinghouse for information to both banks that are interested in expanding
their reach through technology or potentially entering into partnerships with
technology firms.”156
One interpretation of this conduct could be that the OCC was doing Wall
Street’s bidding. It seems at first glance an unusual move for any administrative
agency, let alone one charged with promoting competition, to seek ways of
facilitating growth partnerships for the already too-big banks it regulates.
Facilitating growth opportunities is more what a for-profit management
consulting firm would do for lucrative multi-million dollar consulting fees.157

149. National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 38
(2012)).
150. See, e.g., Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 401 (1987).
151. Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered
sections of 12 & 18 U.S.C.).
152. See, e.g., Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034, 1036 (2d Cir. 1989); Sec. Indus. Ass’n v.
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 847 F.2d 890, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
153. See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519 (2009); see also Victoria McGrane,
Treasury Assails OCC on Draft Rule Officials Say Regulator Gives National Banks Too
Broad a Shield From State Consumer-Financial Laws, WALL STREET J., June 29, 2011, at C3.
154. See Hochstein, supra note 57.
155. See supra Part II.A.
156. See Jacob Schlesinger, The Tricky Task of Regulating Fintech: Comptroller of the Currency
Thomas Curry Talks About Balancing Safety and Innovation, WALL STREET J., June 20, 2016,
at R7 (alteration in original).
157. See generally DUFF MCDONALD, THE FIRM: THE STORY OF MCKINSEY AND ITS SECRET
INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN BUSINESS (2013).
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The OCC, unlike most other regulators, is dependent on banks’ payments for
funding, and many have argued that it has been captured as a result.158
The capture explanation, however, is at odds with Curry’s reputation as
one of the toughest comptrollers in overseeing banks’ safety and soundness159
and with his public praise for the value of fintech competition.160 The OCC
under Curry blocked large financial institutions from potentially profitable
product lines such as short-term loans (a cousin of payday lending) that would
be a threat to safety and soundness.161
My alternative explanation—albeit one not mutually exclusive from industry
capture—is mission conflict. From an organizational ethos of safety and
soundness, extending licenses to fintechs can be seen as a risk because it would
support institutions that pose a threat to any particular bank’s profitability.
Even if the OCC does not consciously seek to protect banks from competition, it
lacks the institutional incentive to divert its resources away from safety and
soundness monitoring to developing fintech licenses.
By way of contrast, before Curry instructed his employees to study how to
promote bank-fintech partnerships, the U.K.’s financial competition regulator
had launched several programs to enable fintech startups to compete, and had
authorized many fintechs to enter the market.162 That U.K. financial regulator is
less conflicted than its American counterparts because it is not charged with
bank safety and soundness.163 The U.K. is an instructive reference point because
it is where one of the first major fintech innovations was born, peer-to-peer
lending.164 Also, London has rivaled New York as the world’s financial capital.165

158. See Wilmarth, supra note 48, at 1404; see also Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial
Regulation and the Regulation of Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991,
1994 (2014) (book review).
159. See Ben Protess, From London Whale to Wells Fargo, a Bank Regulator Looks Back, N.Y.
TIMES, May 6, 2017, at B5.
160. See Schlesinger, supra note 156 (noting Curry’s support for fintech bringing competitive
pressure to banks).
161. See Yuka Hayashi, Banks Want a Piece of the Payday-Loan Pie, WALL STREET J., May 22, 2017,
at B8.
162. See John Thornhill, Regulators Have a Chance to Loosen the Reins on Fintech, FIN. TIMES,
May 9, 2016, at 9 (mentioning also a regulatory sandbox).
163. See About Us, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY, http://www.the-fca.org.uk/about [http://perma.cc/
2R8Y-NKG2] (noting its goals of “[p]rotecting consumers,” “[e]nhancing market agency,”
and “[p]romoting competition”).
164. Zachary Adams Mason, Online Loans Across State Lines: Protecting Peer-to-Peer Lending
Through the Exportation Doctrine, 105 GEO. L.J. 217, 218 (2016).
165. See, e.g., Arthur Kimball-Stanley, A Tale of Two Cities: Regulating Equity Derivatives in New
York and London, 32 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 455, 455 (2009).
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At a more delayed pace, the OCC has explored the possibility of considering
applications for special-purpose fintech charters.166 It remains to be seen
whether this new license will address fintech entry barriers, but there are
grounds for skepticism. The license has come under criticism for imposing
excessively tough requirements on fintech applicants, particularly start-ups.167
The goal of eliminating barriers to entry is also at odds with how the OCC
announced the new licensing effort. The OCC emphasized that the new license
would not “weaken the competitive position of existing banks” but, if anything,
would “level the playing field” by ensuring regulations currently applied to
national banks also applied to fintech.168
Even if the OCC eventually offers fintech licenses perfectly, the delay in
taking that step may have insulated established banks long enough to enable
them to develop their own technologies and partnerships. One year after JP
Morgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon warned shareholders that “Silicon Valley is
coming,” he triumphantly assured them, “We have built our own extraordinary
in-house big data capabilities—we think as good as any in Silicon
Valley.”169 Continued discretion by the OCC will be required in granting new
licenses and in adapting licensing to changing financial markets. The OCC
lacks the institutional structure to foster healthy competition in those future
decisions.
As another perspective on the relationship between institutional
motivation and mission, the CFPB has no stability mandate and instead focuses
on consumers’ interests.170 Long before the OCC took any action to consider
special-purpose licenses, the CFPB developed a program, Project Catalyst, to
reduce fintech uncertainty and encourage innovation. The program lets
innovative financial firms apply for “no-action letters.” These letters would state
the agency’s intention not to bring an enforcement action against a company
introducing a new financial product—if that product had the potential for
“substantial consumer benefit.”171 This policy contrasts with the OCC’s stated
166. See Lalita Clozel, OCC Grants Fintech Request to Join the Banking System, AM. BANKER, Jan.
2017, at 8.
167. See, e.g., Lalita Clozel, The Hurdle Is High, After All, AM. BANKER, May 2017, at 8.
168. Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Address at Georgetown University Law
Center Regarding Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech Companies (Dec. 2,
2016),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/CurrySpeech1202.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ LDN7-GUXG].
169. See Alexander Eule, Big Financials Take on Fintech; PayPal Caves With Visa Deal, BARRON’S,
July 25, 2016, at 23.
170. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 118, at 1.
171. See Kelly Thompson Cochran, The CFPB at Five Years: Beyond the Numbers, 21 N.C.
BANKING INST. 55, 82 (2017).
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goal of promoting “collaboration”172 and helping “banks that are interested in
expanding their reach through technology or potentially entering into
partnerships with technology firms.”173 The CFPB’s focus was on innovation
benefitting consumers; the OCC’s on innovation benefitting banks.
b.

Antitrust

Antitrust authority in finance lies with different agencies, depending on
which financial institution is involved, which laws are implicated, and the type
of deal.174 Anticompetitive mergers or conduct can give a bank extra profits,
making its financial position more immediately stable. The resulting
organizational conflict with bank safety and soundness is relevant to banking
regulators’ broader role in antitrust, but the rest of this Part focuses on bank
mergers because the FDIC, OCC, and Federal Reserve are the most important
actors in that area.175 Additionally, mergers increase industry concentration,
one of the factors empirically linked to the competition shortcomings discussed
above.176
Merger law did not traditionally accommodate financial stability
considerations to any great extent.177 But federal agencies arguably view
consolidation as increasing stability, causing them to treat antitrust policy goals
as “subordinate to stability concerns.”178 The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act leaves
prioritization unclear but directs the responsible banking regulator to consider
“risks to the stability of the United States banking or financial system” in
approving or denying a merger.179
Even without a clear statutory mandate or explicit intent, financial
regulators are susceptible to irrationally prioritizing stability over competition

172. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SUPPORTING RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION
IN THE FEDERAL BANKING SYSTEM: AN OCC PERSPECTIVE 10 (2016), http://www.occ.gov/
publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/pub-responsible-innovationbanking-system-occ-perspective.pdf [http://perma.cc/FF47-K9VJ].
173. Schlesinger, supra note 156.
174. This discussion omits the international dimension of antitrust. See Sokol, supra note 142, at
1093.
175. When a deal is between two banks, the relevant prudential regulator shares jurisdiction with
the Department of Justice (DOJ). See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2) (2012). For the DOJ’s role, and
reliance on prudential regulators, see infra Part IV.A.2.
176. See supra Part II.C.
177. See Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 3, at 1391, 1393.
178. Id. at 1394 (quoting David M. Kaden, The Next Philadelphia National Bank: Reclaiming
Antitrust Law for Bank Competition Policy 6 (May 20, 2010) (unpublished manuscript)).
179. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 604(d), 12 U.S.C.
§ 1842(c)(7); see id. §§ 1843(j)(2)(A), 1828(c)(5).
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because core parts of antitrust analyses are imprecise. Analyzing the tradeoff
between procompetitive and anticompetitive effects can be “as much an
exercise in judgment as mathematics.”180 For bank mergers, antitrust
authorities consider “whether the parties have demonstrated that the merger
will yield efficiencies sufficient to offset any anticompetitive effects.”181
Predicting anticompetitive effects, such as higher consumer prices, requires
modeling a dynamic future economy with countless variables. That analysis is
uncertain in any industry,182 and it is particularly “difficult to demonstrate
anticompetitive effects in the case of banking.”183
In contrast, the cost savings from bank mergers are more concrete. Prior
to the merger, cost cuts can be identified from overlapping bank branches
closed or jobs eliminated. Thus, asking a prudential regulator to block a merger
amounts to asking it to bet on an indeterminate, possible advancement of its
secondary mission—competition—rather than the more concrete and likely
advancement of its primary mission of making a bank more safe and sound.
Presumably, bank regulators would not consciously promote
anticompetitive banks. From a psychological perspective, however, jobs
and institutional affiliations influence how individuals process information
and form conclusions.184 Observers saw a similar mission focus leading up to
the financial crisis of 2008. During that time, prudential regulators ignored
concrete evidence of predatory lending and consumer protection violations that
brought significant profits to banks.185 Moreover, that predatory lending
contributed to a mortgage crisis that helped trigger institutional failures and a

180. Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Commensurability Myth in Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1, 1
(2016).
181. Robert E. Litan, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the
Antitrust Section of the ABA: Antitrust Assessment of Bank Mergers (April 6, 1994),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/antitrust-assessment-bank-mergers
[https://perma.cc/T8S3-T6LK].
182. Competition may force the firm to pass on its cost savings to consumers. Alternatively, the
smaller number of remaining firms may settle on a higher pricing equilibrium.
183. Baxter, supra note 4, at 833. Once the government establishes a prima facie case, however,
concrete efficiencies alone will not enable a defendant to prevail. See FTC v. Sysco Corp.,
113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 82–83 (D.D.C. 2015).
184. See Christoph Engel & Elke U. Weber, The Impact of Institutions on the Decision How to
Decide, 3 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 323, 339–40 (2007) (“Institutions frequently have an
impact on the execution of tasks.”).
185. Yet prudential regulators’ prioritization of safety and soundness endured in the face of clear
evidence about consumer protection violations—such as loans that did not meet the letter of
the law. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 28, at 1317–18; see also Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note
29, at 90.
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recession.186 Thus, prudential regulators paid insufficient attention to a
subordinate mission—consumer protection—even though it in many ways
turned out to support the broader purpose of their dominant safety and
soundness mission.
A final consideration that may hinder regulatory action is visibility. If a
bank fails, the prudential regulator would expose itself to intense public blame
because the bank’s collapse would be evident.187 But if the regulator allows a
merger that slightly increases credit product prices in a few years or even
immediately, public backlash is far less likely.188 Even in the face of great
unpopularity, Wall Street has in recent years succeeded in obstructing reforms
mandated by recent federal legislation.189 There is little institutional reason to
expect prudential regulators to take a strong position against potentially
anticompetitive bank conduct or mergers based on uncertain, probabilistic
analyses. Nor can they be expected to devote substantial resources to those
causes.
The Dodd-Frank Act sought both to end “Too Big to Fail” banks and to
improve financial stability. It did so largely by expanding prudential regulators’
safety and soundness activities.190 Dodd-Frank also empowered a new body,
FSOC, to restrict the growth of a systemically important financial institution
(most prominently, a large bank), by preventing it from merging or offering
certain products.191 But “[t]he twin goals of Dodd-Frank are to ensure the
stability of the financial system and to protect consumers,”192 a reflection of the
immediately preceding mortgage and financial crisis. The Act’s growth-limiting

186. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Markets, Systemic Risk, and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 61 SMU
L. REV. 209, 209 (2008).
187. This would be especially true if a regulator blocked a deal that would have likely strengthened
the bank.
188. Of course, failing to block a problematic merger could also have repercussions. See, e.g., Sokol,
supra note 142, at 1074. But prices in finance are very difficult to understand and compare
even at the same point in time. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 29, at 13. It would be
especially difficult for the public to observe subtle price differences in credit products from
mergers even over short time periods. Nor have economists’ findings of such results attracted
great attention. See Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1160–66
(2008) (providing statistical evidence of a decline in “antitrust’s national political salience”).
189. See Wilmarth, supra note 48, at 1283.
190. The Act attempted to achieve this goal largely by supervising financial institutions more
closely, requiring a firm to have more capital available, mandating resolution planning, and
establishing a special resolution regime for financial institutions. See Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 171, 12 U.S.C. § 5371 (2012); id. § 5384; 15
U.S.C. § 8323.
191. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1852(a), 5331(a).
192. Tanya D. Marsh, Reforming the Regulation of Community Banks After Dodd-Frank, 90 IND.
L.J. 179, 224 (2015).
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provisions were not designed to advance competition, and prudential
regulators’ approval is required for the exercise of these provisions.193
Whereas prudential regulators have implemented the Dodd-Frank
institutional safety and soundness mandates,194 FSOC’s growth-limiting
authority has yet to be used. Prudential regulators’ competition leadership
reduces the weight of consumer welfare in the antitrust analysis.
2.

The DOJ and FTC: Limited Expertise and Authority

The DOJ and FTC share antitrust authority over most industries. But to
develop market-specific expertise, they have largely divided up responsibilities,
with the DOJ taking the lead for finance.195 The DOJ may have previously
provided more of an independent perspective on banking antitrust
enforcement. Many court battles through the early 1980s featured the DOJ and
prudential regulators on opposite sides, sometimes in front of the U.S. Supreme
Court.196
Since 1985, however, the DOJ has developed a highly
“cooperat[ive]” and “collegial” merger relationship with prudential
regulators.197 Institutional dynamics, statutes, and jurisprudence increase the
likelihood that the DOJ will defer to prudential regulators for bank merger
decisions, and possibly make the DOJ less active in other areas.
Growing DOJ reliance on prudential regulators was a natural result of the
evolution of antitrust analyses and financial markets. Starting in the 1980s,
financial institutions began to reach a size and complexity never seen before.
As OCC Comptroller John Hawke recounted in 2004:
Derivatives trading, hedging, securitization, credit scoring, and
structured finance, which are all routine parts of banking today, were
exotic or nonexistent 30 years ago. . . . In 1960, there were only three
banks with real assets of $25 billion or more; in 2000 that number had

193. A two-thirds vote is required to restrict large financial institutions’ growth, and prudential
regulators make up more than one-third of voting members.
See 12 U.S.C.
§§ 5513(c)(3)(A), 5321, 5331.
194. Margaret Ryznar et al., Implementing Dodd-Frank Act Stress Testing, 14 DEPAUL BUS. & CO.
323, 325 (2016).
195. See The Enforcers, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guideantitrust-laws/enforcers [http://perma.cc/3R8F-L6UD]. The division of industries is
consistent with growing economic awareness of the importance of market-specific antitrust
analyses. See, e.g., Richard J. Sexton & Nathalie Lavoie, Food Processing and Distribution: An
Industrial Organization Approach, in 1 HANDBOOK OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 863, 865–
66 (Bruce L. Gardner & Gordon C. Rausser eds., 2001).
196. See J. Robert Kramer II, Antitrust Review in Banking and Defense, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV.
111, 116 (2002).
197. See id. at 117.
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risen to 34. . . . After the most recent mergers, the U.S. now has three
banking companies with over one trillion in assets.198

Whereas a single OCC safety and soundness examiner could, until the
1980s, come in to a medium-sized bank and go through the books in a day,199
examinations now take months or, at the largest banks, require scores of yearround “resident” examiners.200
The agency with greater market-specific expertise in any financial
analysis is the prudential regulator. The DOJ has admitted that it leans so
heavily on prudential regulators that it conducts banking merger reviews
“with many fewer resources than in its merger reviews in other
industries.”201 Even if the DOJ devoted the same amount of resources to
each industry, it would mean about forty-four full-time equivalent
employees for consumer financial matters.202 In contrast, the FDIC has over
6000 employees and the OCC almost 4000 devoted solely to financial
regulation,203 in addition to the Federal Reserve’s over 16,000 total
employees focused on diverse financial goals.204
Another way of
conceptualizing the gap is that the OCC has more examiners devoted fulltime, year-round to examining a single large bank today, such as Bank of
America, than the DOJ devotes to competition issues for the entire banking
system. This resource imbalance could make it more difficult for the DOJ to
provide an independent and informed perspective whenever a banking agency
is involved.
Limited resources devoted to financial markets, along with how those
resources are organizationally structured, may undermine the DOJ’s ability to
198. John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Address at a Conference on Credit Rating
and Scoring Models 6–8 (May 17, 2004), http://www.occ.gov/static/newsissuances/speeches/ 2004/pub-speech-2004-36.pdf [http://perma.cc/8F3N-6BPF].
199. See id. at 2–5.
200. Levitin, supra note 158, at 2044.
201. See Kramer, supra note 196, at 117.
202. This was calculated by 705 employees divided by 32 industries, then multiplied by two. The
numbers were derived from E-mail from Jenna A. Simotes, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of
Pub. Affairs, to author (May 10, 2017) (on file with author) (stating that the DOJ Antitrust
Division has 705 employees), and Sections and Offices, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/atr/sections-and-offices [https://perma.cc/F9PB-RYED] (listing
thirty-two different industries covered by the DOJ Civil sections, including credit cards and
banking).
203. FDIC, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 156 (2017) (listing 6096 employees); OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, at iii (2016) (listing 3955
employees).
204. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., 102ND ANNUAL REPORT 308 (2015). Only a fraction
of these employees would be regularly involved in merger analyses, but the larger group can
be consulted in forming the regulator’s institutional conclusion.
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execute duties even when financial regulators lack antitrust authority. The
DOJ’s Antitrust Division is split across eighteen sections and offices, with banking
being one of seven industries in the “Litigation II Section,” along with numerous
others such as highway construction and waste.205 Credit cards and other
financial services would be handled in the “Networks and Technology
Enforcement Section,” along with various other industries such as hardware
manufacturing and professional associations.206 The criminal division would
also handle financial matters. The co-location of non-bank financial services
with technology offers some advantages for dealing with the technological side
of fintech. But the dispersed location of limited financial competition resources
across three sections, intermixed with unrelated industries, makes it
organizationally challenging to keep up with market changes driven by financial
innovation.
Additionally, the DOJ has a narrower mandate in merger analyses because
it can only consider the competition implications of a deal. The DOJ must defer
to prudential regulators’ perspective on what the financial system needs, since
they are statutorily charged with such considerations.207 Prudential regulators
are further allowed to approve a deal “whose effect . . . may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly” if “the anticompetitive
effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest
by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and
needs of the community to be served.”208 Putting financial competition
expertise aside, the DOJ lacks the ability to speak to other considerations
that could be determinative.
Finally, Supreme Court jurisprudence likely discourages the DOJ from
taking action in fintech. In Credit Suisse v. Billing, the Court found that
securities laws can give immunity from an antitrust claim.209 Part of the
reasoning was that there is a “fine, complex, detailed line separat[ing]
activity that the [Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)] permits or
encourages (for which respondents must concede antitrust immunity) from
activity that the SEC must (and inevitably will) forbid.”210 As one of the
factors in determining whether regulation supersedes antitrust, the Court
205. See E-mail from Jenna A. Simotes, supra note 202 (giving employee count); Sections and
Offices, supra note 202.
206. Sections and Offices, supra note 202.
207. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 604(d), (e)(1), (f), 12
U.S.C. §§ 1842(c), 1843(j)(2)(A), 1828(c)(5) (2012).
208. Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842(c)(2), 1828(c)(5)(B).
209. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 276 (2007).
210. Id. at 279.
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also considered “the existence of regulatory authority under the securities law
to supervise the activities in question.”211 Commentators have interpreted this
ruling, and the preceding Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko, LLP212 decision, as curtailing the DOJ’s ability to intervene in heavily
regulated markets.213 Even though not on point,214 these rulings may provide
additional reason for further DOJ deference to prudential regulators given their
broad supervision of banking activities.
3.

Summary of Mismatch

U.S. financial competition policy lacks agency leadership. The DOJ has no
antitrust rulemaking ability,215 and the FTC has used its antitrust rulemaking
authority only once, in the 1960s.216 Prudential regulators have not developed
policies enabling fintechs to meaningfully compete.217 Faced with banks blocking
fintech advisers’ access to customer data,218 the U.K. was able to rely on an
unconflicted financial competition regulator to write rules prohibiting such
conduct so that consumers could better compare products.219 Congress passed
legislation in 2010 asking the CFPB to decide whether to write such rules.220
Choosing the CFPB, an agency focused on consumer protection, to do what is
arguably more of a competition task speaks to the lack of any true financial
competition authority. The CFPB has written numerous consumer protection
rules since 2010, but has yet to write a rule on data access.
211. Id. at 275.
212. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
213. See, e.g., Howard A. Shelanski, The Case for Rebalancing Antitrust and Regulation, 109 MICH.
L. REV. 683, 684, 713 (2011).
214. The Court has held that the Bank Merger Act did not immunize mergers from federal
antitrust laws. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350 (1963).
215. Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in Antitrust
Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 841 (2006) (“The DOJ enjoys no express or implicit
grant of rulemaking authority within the antitrust realm.”).
216. See Royce Zeisler, Note, Chevron Deference and the FTC: How and Why the FTC Should Use
Chevron to Improve Antitrust Enforcement, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 266, 282 (“Excluding
the single Clayton Act rule, the [Federal Trade Commission (FTC)] has not issued rules
under its antitrust mandate.”); see also C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to
Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 629, 677–81 (2009) (arguing for greater FTC exercise of its antitrust rulemaking
authority).
217. See supra Part IV.A.1.
218. See supra Part II.A.
219. See James Eyers, Banks Resist Fintech Push for Open Data Regime, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV.
(Aug. 22, 2016, 9:01 AM), http://www.afr.com/technology/banks-resist-fintech-push-foropen-data-regime-20160816-gqthn0 [https://perma.cc/D68Q-KW2N].
220. See infra note 256 and accompanying text.
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Outside of banking, the DOJ has shown some motivation to prosecute
large financial institutions for conduct. It has compelled major credit card
companies to abandon contract agreements limiting merchants’ ability to offer
discounts to customers for other forms of payment.221 Those cases, however,
lacked the same finance-specific expertise constraints, since the contracts at
issue were with merchants ranging from restaurants to retail stores. In other
contexts, observers have noted a lack of antitrust action, such as slowness to
respond to exclusionary tactics preventing new entrants in credit card and
derivative markets.222 More study is needed of the extent to which the DOJ
consults prudential regulators in conduct investigations, since statutes do not
require such consultation in the same way as for ex ante blocking of mergers.223
In banking, mergers have for decades occurred largely unobstructed.
Between 1980 and 2009 almost 11,000 banking mergers occurred, and
“during this time, no regulator challenged a prospective merger involving an
institution with more than $1 million in assets on antitrust grounds.”224 Banks
have, however, been required at times to divest bank branches.225 Mergers and
high market concentration have increased banks’ market power,226 but studies
are inconclusive as to whether mergers have brought efficiencies.227 The three
biggest bank holding companies, Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, and Bank of
America, are the result of numerous mergers approved, and at times
encouraged, by financial regulators.228 These banks also each received costly
bailouts during the most recent financial crisis.229
Following the 2008 financial crisis, regulators are much more likely to
block a mega-merger among the largest banks, and Dodd-Frank took steps

221. United States v. Am. Express Co., No. 10-CV-4496, 2011 WL 2974094, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July
20, 2011).
222. See Felix B. Chang, Second-Generation Monopolization: Parallel Exclusion in Derivatives
Markets, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 657, 660; Hemphill & Wu, supra note 7, at 1202
(articulating the problem of parallel exclusion, including by credit card companies).
223. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (2012) (omitting any mention of joint jurisdiction for conduct).
224. See Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 3, at 1391.
225. See, e.g., Society Corp. and Ameritrust Corp., 57 Fed. Reg. 10,371 (Dep’t of Justice, Mar. 25,
1992) (notice of final judgment). Prudential regulators are generally required to consult the
DOJ for a competitive report on proposed bank merger transactions, and the DOJ’s ability to
challenge transactions gives it “significant leverage in negotiating procompetitive
divestitures.” See Weinstein, supra note 143, at 331–32.
226. See supra notes 92–94.
227. See Erik Devos et al., Efficiency and Market Power Gains in Bank Megamergers: Evidence
From Value Line Forecasts, 45 FIN. MGMT. 1011, 1011 (2016).
228. See Karmel, supra note 146, at 8; David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 187, 208 (2010) (discussing the U.S. Treasury’s role in facilitating mergers).
229. See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 146, at 1, 8.
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toward making sure that happens.230 Nonetheless, in recent years, regulators
have continued to allow a range of deals, including “large and unusual
alliances among banks, software and hardware developers, and other nonbank entities.”231 Regulators presented no obstacles to big banks’ wave of
small-scale fintech strategic acquisitions,232 which could serve as a tremendous
source of growth.233 Larger deals have also been recently allowed, such as the
Federal Reserve’s 2012 approval of Capital One’s $6.3 billion purchase of one
of the most popular online account providers, ING Direct, thereby making
Capital One the sixth-largest depository institution.234 The OCC has not denied
any of the 455 merger applications it received between 2012 and 2016.235
A long history of inaction does not by itself mean ineffective policy.236 The
evidence overall indicates, however, substantial competitive shortcomings in
financial markets and a flawed regulatory design. No single agency has the
expertise, motivation, and authority to advance competition.
B.

A New Proposal

Interdisciplinary research has underscored that in designing regulators, “a
key danger to avoid is giving a single agency conflicting responsibilities.”237
Policymakers have in other spheres reallocated divergent mandates into
230. 12 U.S.C. § 1852(b) (2012) (prohibiting mergers that would create an entity beyond the
concentration limit of 10 percent of aggregate financial sector liabilities). The restrictions are
subject to recommendation and numerous exceptions, such as when the bank to be acquired
is in “danger of default.” Id. § 1852(b)–(c).
231. Marty Fisher-Haydis & Kara R. Yancey, Note, Electronic Banking, 16 ANN. REV. BANKING L.
76, 99 (1997).
232. Cf. Antitrust Case Filings, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-case-filings
[http://perma.cc/XDW2-XYHT]; supra Part I.A.
233. See supra Part III.A.
234. H. Rodgin Cohen, Preventing the Fire Next Time: Too Big to Fail, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1717, 1741
(2012); Press Release, Capital One, Capital One Completes Acquisition of ING Direct (Feb.
17,
2012),
http://press.capitalone.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=251626&p=irolnewsArticle&ID=1858727 [http://perma.cc/S2GM-CEJU].
235. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 203, at 30; OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 26 (2015); OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 37 (2014); OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 37 (2013); OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 31 (2012). These figures include
failure transactions.
236. It is impossible to know how many harmful mergers were never pursued because banks
thought regulators would object. Also, inaction by itself cannot demonstrate ineffectiveness,
as a correct decision not to intervene is valuable to society.
237. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design,
89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 50 (2010); Young Han Chun & Hal G. Rainey, Goal Ambiguity in U.S.
Federal Agencies, 15 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 1 (2005).
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separate bodies following high-stakes agency failures, such as those surrounding
the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
These organizational design changes have reached offshore oil production,238
consumer protection,239 atomic energy, federal labor, and emergency
management.240 Financial competition is less immediately identifiable as the
cause of a disaster, but is too crucial in a rapidly evolving economy to be
neglected due to co-location with stability regulation.
Generalist antitrust agencies could on their own initiative do more,
but it would not be ideal to rely on them for leadership in a complex and
idiosyncratic industry. Among other complicating factors, excess size in
banking brings industry-specific considerations such as taxpayer bailouts and
systemic risk.241 Yet antitrust agencies continue to apply the same blanket crossindustry antitrust rules, such as not requiring pre-approval for mergers under
about a $323 million threshold.242 A finance-specific reevaluation is needed to
determine the appropriate criteria for approving big banks’ purchase of
small fintechs, and more broadly to implement a tailored competition policy in
the fintech era.
To address current regulatory shortcomings, Congress should task a
different agency (or agencies)243 with leadership of financial competition. Other
agencies such as the DOJ’s Antitrust Division and the OCC could retain
secondary authority.244 The following features would make an institutional
home(s) for competition leadership more attractive: (1) minimal mission
conflict; (2) relevant technological, institutional, and market expertise; and (3) a

238. See Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill,
63 FLA. L. REV. 1077 (2011).
239. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
240. HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41485, REORGANIZATION OF THE MINERALS
MANAGEMENT SERVICE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL 25–30
(2010).
241. See Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 3.
242. Smaller deals are more difficult for antitrust authorities, as only mergers above a certain
threshold, about $323 million depending on deal type, would require pre-approval by the
DOJ. Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 8524
(Jan. 26, 2017).
243. For example, the same agency could, but need not, enforce both licensing and antitrust.
Indeed, licensing duties might feasibly be separated into the licensing of depository
institutions receiving FDIC insurance, and non-depository institutions.
244. The U.K.’s safety and soundness regulator has “a secondary objective to facilitate effective
competition.”
Prudential
Regulation
Authority,
BANK
ENG.,
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/C68V-NUHR].
Partnerships between the proposed competition body and prudential regulators are also
possible for licensing new entrants, as has happened in the U.K. Arner et al., supra note 44,
at n.184.
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culture conducive to both writing and enforcing laws. Three potential locations
for such an entity are briefly considered here, before turning to the issue of
interagency coordination.
1.

The CFPB as Competition Enforcer

Among existing agencies, the CFPB is most immediately set up for success
in writing competition rules, developing fintech startup licenses, and enforcing
antitrust. Above all, competition law’s goals are largely aligned with the CFPB’s
mission. The CFPB is the only federal agency focused on advancing the
financial interests of consumers. The predominant view in the United States
is that antitrust law aims to advance consumer welfare, with a particular focus on
low consumer prices.245 Consumer protection and competition policy are
complementary because they both advance consumer welfare and resist
anticompetitive pricing.246 Due to their complementary missions, consumer
protection and antitrust are in other countries commonly housed together
separate from the primary financial stability regulator—a model known as “twin
peaks.”247 U.S. lawmakers have, in industries other than finance, co-located
authority for consumer protection and antitrust in a single agency.248
The CFPB’s activities demonstrate the alignment of missions. The bureau
has acted quickly to develop incubator policies supporting fintech innovation.249
The CFPB would incur little, if any, mission conflict in prioritizing the needs of
consumers and the communities that banks serve by enabling fintech startups to
compete. Preventing deception and other consumer protection goals makes
markets more competitive by ensuring consumers have the information they

245. See Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 3, at 1392 (“[The] U.S. approach to antitrust
policy . . . generally embraces the idea that the only appropriate concern of antitrust law
is to promote and protect competition so that the prices paid by consumers will be as
low as possible.”); Guide to Antitrust Laws, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws
[http://perma.cc/KVG6-ZZDM]
(explaining its enforcement of antitrust laws serves to “promote vigorous competition and
protect consumers from anticompetitive mergers and business practices”).
246. See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 547, 582–83
(2016) (linking competition and consumer protection in the context of dispute resolution);
see also, e.g., Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at
War with Each Other, 121 YALE L.J. 2216, 2216 (2012) (acknowledging complementarities
between antitrust and consumer protection).
247. See Allen, supra note 32, at 1140.
248. The FTC has consumer protection and competition authority in many industries, including
health care. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman, Consume or Invest: What
Do/Should Agency Leaders Maximize?, 91 WASH. L. REV. 295, 310 (2016).
249. See supra Part IV.A.1.a.
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need to make effective decisions.250 The importance of informed consumers for
the CFPB’s mission explains its support for advisory fintechs.251
The CFPB also has three areas of relevant expertise: technology, fintech
business models, and consumer markets. Issuing effective fintech licenses
requires adapting to fast-changing markets and innovative business models and
products.252 Because the CFPB was created in 2011 with a heavy technology
orientation, it may be the most technologically sophisticated financial regulator.
The agency has even launched its own suite of online tools for helping
consumers to make better decisions, such as a mortgage calculator that gives
home buyers tailored interest rate advice.253
The CFPB has various regulatory responsibilities that require the agency
to gain expertise about consumer fintech business models that other financial
regulators lack. It has already undertaken enforcement actions against fintechs for
consumer protection violations.254 The CFPB is unique among federal
regulators in its ability to supervise both banks and nonbanks.255 Because many
fintech startups are nonbanks offering similar services as banks, and because
many aspire to become banks, the CFPB is far more familiar than prudential
regulators with the array of organizations needing licenses and seeking to merge
with banks. The CFPB gained further fintech competition expertise due to the
three-year study it recently undertook, by statutory mandate, to determine what
data financial institutions should be required to share with fintechs.256
Finally, the CFPB has relevant consumer financial market expertise,
especially relative to the two primary antitrust agencies, the DOJ and FTC. It has
a markets and research group filled with economists who study consumer
transactions. This research group analyzes the efficiency and competition
implications of a given consumer finance rule.257 Besides the fact that the
DOJ presumably has about forty-four full-time employees devoted to finance,
when the DOJ and FTC analyze banking mergers, they draw on a general pool

250. John Y. Campbell et al., Consumer Financial Protection, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2011, at 91,
107–08.
251. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
252. See supra Part IV.A.1.a.
253. See Van Loo, supra note 40, at 1305–06.
254. See Erin J. Illman, CFPB Focuses on Financial Technology in 2016—Expect More for 2017,
BANKING & FIN. SERV. POL’Y REP., Jan. 2017, at 1, 2.
255. Steven Antonakes, Deputy Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Address at the Exchequer
Club (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/ preparedremarks-of-cfpb-deputy-director-steven-antonakes-at-the-exchequer-club
[http://perma.cc/6YWQ-AVH6].
256. See 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2012); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 118, at 2.
257. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 118, at 2–4.
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of economists and lawyers.258 These agencies have valuable experience with
antitrust analyses. But they lack the consumer finance expertise of an agency
with 1600 employees dedicated to that area.259
Moving competition authority to the CFPB would have several downsides.
Just as the prudential regulators developed a pro-bank ethos due to their core
safety and soundness mission, the CFPB could be counterproductively hard on
banks due to its core consumer protection mission. In theory, this ethos could
lead it to block beneficial mergers. Such concerns are minimized by the fact that
blocking beneficial mergers would hurt consumers, and thus the agency would
be motivated to allow beneficial mergers, if it were acting rationally. But as
discussed above, the indeterminacy of competition analyses open the possibility
for irrational regulatory decisions.260
Another shortcoming is that competition and consumer protection are
distinct missions, even if many of their goals align. The CFPB’s intellectual
founders and early leaders stressed the uniqueness and value of its “sole focus on
consumer financial protection.”261 Consumer protection enforcement focuses
mostly on what consumers need, while licensing requires also considering what
businesses need. Consumer protection advocates might also worry that an
efficiency-driven competition policy mission would drown out major consumer
protection analyses that consider fairness and rights.
The mission conflict between consumer protection and competition is an
important risk to consider, but is less worrisome in light of the intellectual
foundations of consumer protection today. CFPB reports have repeatedly
emphasized efficiency and market analyses as part of what the agency does.262
The agency’s authorizing statute allows it to declare an act substantially injuring
consumers to be unfair only if the resulting “injury is not outweighed by
countervailing benefits . . . to competition.”263
Then-Professor Elizabeth
Warren and Professor Oren Bar-Gill concluded their case for the CFPB partly

258. See Guide to Antitrust Laws, supra note 245. Because those agencies handle mergers in many
different industries, at any given time they will only be analyzing mergers in a subset of
industries. This means they cannot dedicate economists full-time to consumer finance as can
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. See The Enforcers, supra note 195.
259. Cochran, supra note 171, at 58.
260. See supra Part IV.A.1.b.
261. Antonakes, supra note 255; see Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 29, at 98–100 (pointing out
the drawbacks of subsuming consumer protection under safety and soundness).
262. In a recent fintech study, the CFPB mentioned efficiency fifty-two times in ninety-one pages.
See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 118, at 2.
263. 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2012).
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by observing: “The market for consumer credit [was] not operating
efficiently.”264
Another institutional drawback is the agency’s narrow area of expertise.
The CFPB lacks knowledge about non-consumer markets, but banks serve
institutions and investors as well as consumers. The CFPB would thus either
need to build non-consumer expertise or share authority with another
regulator. The CFPB also lacks knowledge about stability, creating the risk
that it unleashes destabilizing business models on the financial system. This
concern could be further mitigated by allowing the CFPB to issue licenses only to
a particular subset of financial institutions, or by providing additional oversight
of CFPB competition decisions.265
Given the strong political debates surrounding the CFPB, it is worth
considering the political dimensions of authorizing the CFPB as competition
enforcer. Consumer advocates would have reasons to oppose the potential
dilution of the organizational focus on consumer protection. On the other
hand, they could overall embrace the opportunity to ensure fintech
development advances the interests of consumers.
The agency’s critics might resist an expanded mission because they argue
that the CFPB is too powerful.266 The recent PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau267 ruling and legislation in front of Congress,268 if either
survive, may lessen this concern by enabling the President to remove the CFPB
director at will. In the alternative, critics of the CFPB may embrace the prospect
of shifting the agency even more toward competition enforcement and market
efficiency analyses. President Trump has indicated a desire to “redirect the
mission of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.”269 His Core Principles
for financial regulation emphasize the more competition-driven side of financial
regulation, which include seeking to: (1) empower consumers to make
“informed choices in the marketplace”; (2) prevent taxpayer-funded bailouts; and
(3) “enable American companies to be competitive with foreign firms.”270 A
revamped CFPB could empower fintech startups to help consumers make more
“informed choices,” using competition to achieve consumer protection goals.

264. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 29, at 100.
265. See infra Part IV.B.4.
266. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, What Romney Has Said Offers Clues If He Wins, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,
2012, at A12.
267. 839 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
268. Legislative Highlights, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2017, at 10, 10.
269. Bender & Paletta, supra note 109.
270. See Exec. Order No. 13,772, Core Principles for Regulating the United States Financial
System, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965 (Feb. 8, 2017).
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More competition could also allow fintech startups to take business away from
big banks, thereby reducing the need for bailouts. Finally, heightened
competition would make U.S. financial firms more innovative and efficient,
increasing the chance that they will catch up and ultimately compete with
foreign firms. A similar vision is reflected in Republican-driven legislation
emerging from the House Services Committee, which seeks a greater role for
economists and efficiency analyses in the CFPB.271
A dual consumer protection and competition CFPB mandate may thus
offer a political compromise in addition to a significant organizational design
improvement to the regulatory framework.
2.

A New Bureau in the DOJ or FTC

For minimal institutional change, lawmakers might reform the DOJ or the
FTC with an expanded financial competition office. Since these agencies have
no stability mandate, they have less mission conflict than prudential regulators.
The DOJ and FTC also offer the advantage of considerable existing antitrust
expertise. As markets become more intermediated and technological, they raise
related anticompetitive concerns that might justify a coordinated antitrust
approach across diverse markets.272 Keeping financial competition within an
existing competition authority facilitates such coordination. With additional
funding, these agencies could develop greater financial expertise. A generalist
regulator is more resistant to being captured, as the relevant interest groups are
less concentrated.273 The FTC would bring additional synergies because it
enforces some laws outside of antitrust, such as privacy, against fintechs.274
The DOJ and FTC options have several shortcomings. Unlike the CFPB,
they lack substantial financial expertise. Both entities cover many other industries.
If a financial bureau were housed within the existing competition agencies,
financial competition might receive inadequate internal independence. Cuts

271. See Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, HR. 10, 115th Cong. (2017–18) (as passed by House,
June 8, 2017).
272. See D. Daniel Sokol & Roisin Comerford, Antitrust and Regulating Big Data, 23 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 1129, 1131 (2016) (discussing the complementarity of antitrust and consumer
protection in big data); Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of
Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1387–88 (2015) (arguing that retail goods and finance
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to antitrust resources, or shifts in policy, would affect financial competition.
If other industries needed attention, financial competition resources could
be redirected. In the alternative, if the financial competition bureau were
completely independent of the current competition offices, the co-location
synergies would be less, reducing the benefits of housing it in those agencies.
Nor do either of these agencies have strong rulemaking cultures,275 which
could inhibit even a separate financial bureau’s rulemaking activities.
These are not insurmountable obstacles, and a separate bureau or
expanded office would improve the current configuration, which leaves
financial markets divided among two sections, each of which focuses on nonfinancial matters.276 But building FTC or DOJ financial competition is too close
to the existing configuration and potentially retains similar defects.
3.

A New Agency

A new independent agency could take the lead on enforcing antitrust,
extending licenses, and developing a broader financial technology competition
policy—including advocating for removing laws that harm consumer welfare.
An independent financial competition regulator would avoid the potential
mission rivalry with consumer protection and political obstacles that might
result from co-location at the CFPB. A separate agency would also avoid the
lack of rulemaking culture at the DOJ, and the chance of internal
misallocation of resources by leaders who are not focused on finance. Finally, a
new agency would bring greater transparency to the questions of who is
responsible for enforcing financial competition and how many resources are
devoted to that task.
One potential downside is that a new standalone agency would add to an
already long list of financial regulators. The OCC, the Federal Reserve’s
regulatory arm, the National Credit Union Administration, and the FDIC
currently focus on safety and soundness of depository institutions, in addition
to the CFPB’s consumer protection role. Arguably, fewer financial regulators are
needed. Although this concern is understandable from an optical perspective, it
is in many ways an analytically distinct consideration. The overall number of
agencies could be reduced or maintained by consolidating or repurposing
several of the agencies that currently have similar safety and soundness duties to

275. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
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make space for one with a different purpose. The inefficiency of the existing
design should not block a performance-improving change.
A more compelling drawback is that a separate agency would lessen
operational efficiencies compared to a location inside an existing agency
with an antitrust or financial mandate. A related critique is that a separate
agency might pay insufficient attention to the consumer protection and stability
implications of its decisions. Interagency coordination mechanisms could
address these concerns, such as requiring safety and soundness examiners to
provide input into competition decisions. Although coordination across
independent agencies presents barriers, financial regulators work together to a
great extent, and thus a system already exists for that purpose.
4.

FSOC Coordination and Oversight

A recurrent theme above is that competition policy intersects with other
financial regulatory goals. A strong competition authority must, therefore,
operate in tandem with effective consumer protection and prudential
regulation. Removing competition leadership from stability regulators would
most directly sever the internal agency link between those two goals. A
mechanism would thus be needed to ensure the innovation pendulum does not
swing too far in the other direction, without regard for stability.277 FSOC
was designed for such an interagency oversight role, with voting
representatives from diverse financial regulators—including the Federal
Reserve, the SEC, and the CFPB. To guard against overenforcement by the new
financial competition leader, FSOC might be tasked with vetoing financial
competition actions with a two-thirds vote. It currently has similar authority for
consumer protection rules.278 It has yet to veto any of the CFPB’s many rules,
suggesting that FSOC oversight would not subvert competition.279
Additionally, FSOC could provide analytic support through its research
office, which must “conduct, coordinate, and sponsor research to support and
improve regulation of financial entities and markets.”280 FSOC might, for
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instance, help bring a broader set of factors into the traditional competition
analysis, including increased systemic risk and taxpayer bailouts.281
FSOC involvement creates a small risk of mission conflict because—like
the prudential regulators—FSOC is primarily focused on stability. If a large
institution were to collapse and thereby trigger a financial crisis, those at the
FSOC helm “would face intense criticism for having failed in their basic
mission.”282 But unlike prudential regulators, FSOC is not charged with day-today examination of financial institutions for safety and soundness. It can
designate a financial institution as needing such examinations but would not
conduct the examinations itself. Instead, FSOC’s purpose is: (1) to
“promote market discipline” by ending expectations of government bailouts;
(2) to “identify” systemic risks; and (3) to “respond to emerging threats to the
stability of the United States financial system.”283 It is also more specifically
charged with studying how banking concentration affects stability, efficiency,
and competitiveness.284 That broader purview sets it up to more rationally
weigh the longer term stability and bailout-reducing benefits of competition.
Currently, when FSOC meets quarterly to strategize about safeguarding
the financial system, directors of agencies that prioritize stability and consumer
protection attend.285 No member of a body focused on competition is
present, despite abundant awareness that competition is vital to the long-term
health of the financial system. Nor is it clear today which competition
representative from existing regulators would make sense to send. One
advantage of a new agency would be institutionally aligning the three major
financial goals of consumer protection, stability, and competition. A triple
peaks model, with FSOC oversight, may provide the best chance of ensuring that
the main areas of consumer financial law are enforced and coordinated.
CONCLUSION
The fast-evolving fintech landscape has raised the stakes and complexity of
competition policy. Prudential regulators regularly move the competition
needle through decisions to act or refrain from acting. Those decisions would be
difficult with an optimal organizational structure. The current structure
281. See Chang, supra note 222, at 736 (advocating infusing financial risk considerations into
antitrust exclusion analyses); Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 3, at 1396 (“By not factoring in
the enormous costs of bailouts, traditional antitrust analysis leads to a flawed conclusion.”).
282. Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 3, at 1390.
283. 12 U.S.C § 5322.
284. Id. § 1852.
285. Id. §§ 5321(e)(1)), 5322(a)(1).
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debilitates competition decisionmaking under the weight of bank safety and
soundness. Congress has regularly responded to evidence of broken regulation
in other areas by removing mission conflicts. Similar intervention for financial
competition may decide whether fintech produces inefficient and dangerous
firms or helps build a more affordable, accessible, and stable financial system for
all households.
Further study is needed of how agency design affects innovation
competition in consumer finance and other markets. The SEC, as it wrestles
with the proliferation of automated trading and licensing of peer-to-peer
lenders as securities issuers, increasingly must balance systemic risk
concerns.286 In the past, oil, gas, and electricity could be treated as competitive
commodities—refineries and utilities could purchase the cheapest barrel of oil
or kilowatt-hour of electricity. Now, however, diverse state regulators are
prescribing standards for how to produce “low carbon” or “renewable” power,
such as solar, splintering undifferentiated nationwide markets, and creating
new opportunities for energy companies to exercise market power in smaller
market segments.287 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has
frequently been “markedly different” from the DOJ in merger reviews.288 The
FCC also is tasked with extending licenses and stabilizing ownership as
Google Fiber challenges Comcast and Time Warner’s Internet dominance.289
These and other regulatory spheres have unique missions and structures, but
they constitute battlegrounds for ushering in the full benefits of innovation. It is
important to know whether those tasked with enforcing competition are instead
organizationally inclined to broker monopoly power.
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